China’s capital market has made multiple efforts to introduce financial derivatives. In 1992, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges launched the “Dafeyue Warrant” and the “Bao’an Warrant,” respectively, marking the initial introduction of option-based financial instruments in China. However, due to excessive speculation, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) suspended warrant trading in June 1996. It was not until 2005, following the progress of the split-share structure reform, that warrants were reintroduced as part of the reform process. Academic research and regulatory attention have primarily focused on the causes and economic implications of speculative bubbles in China’s warrants market. It aims to contribute to the existing literature by addressing a critical yet underexplored question: whether the warrants market, within the framework of the split-share structure reform, successfully protected the interests of holders of tradable shares?
The impact of the reform on 28 publicly listed companies is investigated that utilized warrants as a form of consideration. By leveraging both public market data and proprietary brokerage information, the fluctuations in public shareholders’ wealth before and after the reform are assessed and performance disparities among different categories of tradable shareholders are explored to evaluate the role of reform-related warrants. Specifically, public market data are employed to compute the adjusted price changes of individual stocks pre- and post-reform, thereby gauging shifts in the wealth of tradable shareholders. An event study methodology is then utilized to determine whether the issuance of warrants resulted in excess returns for tradable shareholders, focusing on abnormal returns during pivotal events such as the announcement of the reform, its implementation, and the listing of warrants. Subsequently, proprietary brokerage data is analyzed to directly assess the gross profits of tradable shareholders during the reform period. This empirical analysis centers on shareholders who were allocated warrants as consideration in the split-share structure reform, specifically investors who received warrants in the primary market for free. By examining account-level trading data for both stocks and warrants, the total profits accrued by these tradable shareholders, encompassing gains from both warrants and the underlying stocks are calculated.
The analysis of public market data reveals that, following the split-share structure reform, the adjusted prices of individual stocks for the 28 companies examined increased by an average of over 10% compared to the period preceding the reform announcement. Account-level data further indicates that approximately 90% of tradable shareholders who held stocks before the reform announcement and received warrants as consideration realized positive returns. It is suggested that the primary market for warrants effectively provided compensation to tradable shareholders. However, previous study in the literature also suggests that, due to shortcomings in secondary market trading mechanisms and inadequate management of investor suitability, speculative bubbles emerged following the listing of the warrants. These bubbles had a detrimental effect on investor wealth and market stability. Complementing the existing literature, a direct analysis of the returns is offered for tradable shareholders who received warrants in the primary market for free, providing robust empirical evidence regarding the compensatory role of warrants in the split-share structure reform. The focus of this paper is shifted from the market bubbles to the role of warrants within the split-share structure reform, highlighting the positive impact that warrants had on the reform process and affirming the potential positive role of financial derivatives in the domain of corporate governance.