农产品市场双寡头区块链采纳决策的演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1918

Abstract

Abstract:

To alleviate consumers’ concerns about the quality of agricultural products and enhance consumers’ perception of product quality， companies are trying to use blockchain technology to trace and disclose the quality of agricultural products. Using signaling game and evolutionary game theories to explore the blockchain technology adoption decisions of two oligopolies in an agricultural market， and further analyze the impact of the presence of loyal consumers and government subsidy mechanisms on the evolutionary equilibrium of blockchain technology adoption decisions. The theoretical results show that the evolutionary equilibrium of these two oligopolies’ blockchain technology adoption decisions depend on the ratio of the added value of blockchain technology to the added value of the agricultural products. When this ratio is sufficiently small and increasing， these two oligopolies will go through three stages， i.e.， from Stage I in which this technology is not adopted by any oligopoly， to Stage II in which this technology is only adopted by one of the two oligopolies who oscillate between adoption and non-adoption， and then to Stage III in which blockchain technology is adopted by both oligopolies. The presence of loyal consumers makes it easier for companies to fall into the swing stage， while the government’s subsidy policies can help companies get out of the swing stage， i.e.， it makes these two oligopolies adopt blockchain technology.

Key words: agricultural products, duopoly, blockchain, signaling game, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F224

Zhiwen Li, Xianhao Xu, Xu Guan, Qingguo Bai, Cheng Chen. Evolutionary Game Analysis for Blockchain Adoption Decisions of Two Oligopolies in An Agricultural Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 324-336.

Figures/Tables 11

符号	说明
$i$	表示产品、分销商的指示号， $i ∈ {1,2}$
$j$	表示两分销商不同的区块链采纳情形， $j ∈ {N N, N A, A N, A A}$
$a$	表示产品质量的不确定性， $a ∈ (0,1)$
$λ$	表示消费者接收到高质量信号的概率， $λ ∈ (1 / 2, 1]$
$ϕ$	表示质量信号的准确率， $ϕ ∈ [0, 1 / 2]$
$β$	表示两产品之间的替代率， $β ∈ [0,1]$
$s$	表示消费者接收到的产品质量信号，高质量信号（ $= h$ ），低质量信号（ $= l$ ）
$η$	表示忠诚型消费者的数量
$S$	表示政府的补贴额度
$q i$	表示产品 $i$ 的真实质量，高质量（ $= q H$ ），低质量（ $= q L$ ）
$Q i$	表示零售商 $i$ 的订购量
$c p i$	表示产品 $i$ 的单位采购成本
$c s i$	表示产品 $i$ 的单位销售成本，其中 $c = c p i + c s i$
$c b$	表示区块链技术的边际采纳成本，其中 $c T = c + c b$
$F$	表示区块链技术的固定采纳成本，其中 $F ≥ 0$
$p i$	表示产品 $i$ 的单位零售价格
$π D i j$	表示分销商 $i$ 在情形 $j$ 下的期望利润
*	表示均衡或最优解的上标

点	$d e t J$	$t r J$
（0，0）	$(π D 1 A N * - π D 1 N N ) (π D 2 N A - π D 2 N N *)$	$π D 1 A N * + π D 2 N A * - π D 1 N N * - π D 2 N N *$
（1，0）	$(π D 1 N N * - π D 1 A N ) (π D 2 A A - π D 2 A N *)$	$π D 1 N N * + π D 2 A A * - π D 1 A N * - π D 2 A N *$
（0，1）	$(π D 1 A A * - π D 1 N A ) (π D 2 N N - π D 2 N A *)$	$π D 1 A A * + π D 2 N N * - π D 1 N A * - π D 2 N A *$
（1，1）	$(π D 1 N A * - π D 1 A A ) (π D 2 A N - π D 2 A A *)$	$π D 1 N A * + π D 2 A N * - π D 1 A A * - π D 2 A A *$
（ $x $ ， $y $ ）	$- (π D 1 A A * - π D 1 N A ) (π D 1 N N - π D 1 A N ) (π D 2 A A - π D 2 A N ) (π D 2 N N - π D 2 N A ) (π D 1 A A + π D 1 N N * - π D 1 N A * - π D 1 A N ) (π D 2 A A + π D 2 N N * - π D 2 A N * - π D 2 N A *)$	0

点	条件I			条件II			条件III
点	$d e t J$	$t r J$	均衡结果	$d e t J$	$t r J$	均衡结果	$d e t J$	$t r J$	均衡结果
（0，0）	+	+	不稳定点	+	+	不稳定点	+	-	ESS
（1，0）	-	-	鞍点	+	-	ESS	-	-	鞍点
（0，1）	-	-	鞍点	+	-	ESS	-	-	鞍点
（1，1）	+	-	ESS	+	+	不稳定点	+	+	不稳定点
（ $x $ ， $y $ ）	不是平衡点			-	0	鞍点	不是平衡点

参数	情形NN	情形AN	情形NA	情形AA
$Q 1 j *$	$1 - c - η 2 + β$	$(2 - β) (1 - c - η) + 4 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - 2 c b 4 - β 2$	$(2 - β) (1 - c - η) - 2 β (2 λ - 1) ϕ a + β c b 4 - β 2$	$1 + 2 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - c T - η 2 + β$
$Q 2 j *$	$1 - c - η 2 + β$	$(2 - β) (1 - c - η) - 2 β (2 λ - 1) ϕ a + β c b 4 - β 2$	$(2 - β) (1 - c - η) + 4 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - 2 c b 4 - β 2$	$1 + 2 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - c T - η 2 + β$
$π D 1 j *$	$[1 - c + (1 + β) η] 2 (2 + β) 2$	$[(2 - β) (1 - c + (1 + β) η) + 4 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - 2 c b] 2 (4 - β 2) 2 - F$	$[(2 - β) (1 - c + (1 + β) η) - 2 β (2 λ - 1) ϕ a + β c b] 2 (4 - β 2) 2$	$[1 + 2 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - c T + (1 + β) η] 2 (2 + β) 2 - F$
$π D 2 j *$	$[1 - c + (1 + β) η] 2 (2 + β) 2$	$[(2 - β) (1 - c + (1 + β) η) - 2 β (2 λ - 1) ϕ a + β c b] 2 (4 - β 2) 2$	$[(2 - β) (1 - c + (1 + β) η) + 4 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - 2 c b] 2 (4 - β 2) 2 - F$	$[1 + 2 (2 λ - 1) ϕ a - c T + (1 + β) η] 2 (2 + β) 2 - F$

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时间	事件
2016年10月	IBM、沃尔玛及清华大学合作共同开发和部署区块链以改善食品（如猪肉和芒果等）的可追溯性和透明性
2017年6月	京东开发和部署JD Chain区块链技术对农副产品（如进口奶粉和酒水）进行了品质溯源
2017年9月	众安科技借助区块链技术推出了“步步鸡”项目，旨在打造生态养殖模式
2017年10月	美国嘉吉公司利用区块链对火鸡的生产和流通环节进行全程溯源
2017年10月	华为依托“智慧农场”项目并利用区块链对“耐盐碱水稻”（俗称“海水稻”）进行全程追踪，包括稻种选育、水稻生产，以及稻米加工、流通和销售等多个环节
2018年8月	阿里巴巴为五常大米引入蚂蚁金服区块链追溯技术

Evolutionary Game Analysis for Blockchain Adoption Decisions of Two Oligopolies in An Agricultural Market

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