Abstract:

In the context of marketing channels， the governance of opportunistic behaviour by enterprises is not solely aimed at establishing a transaction order； it is also intended to achieve economic performance. However， transaction cost theory posits that opportunism is an inherent tendency of economic entities. Consequently， the governance of opportunistic behaviour by enterprises also gives rise to costs associated with the design and implementation of governance mechanisms. It is therefore evident that the complete eradication of opportunistic behaviour through the implementation of governance is not a viable solution. In practice， however， channel enterprises frequently demonstrate a willingness to tolerate opportunistic behaviour. When faced with such behaviour from partner enterprises， they tend to maintain existing relationships， refrain from immediate intervention， and hope that the problem can be resolved independently. Nevertheless， existing literature has primarily focused on the negative consequences of enterprise tolerance on further opportunistic behaviour by partner enterprises， as well as the positive consequences of enterprise-led restoration of trust under certain conditions. There is a notable absence of research on the economic performance of channels.It is posited that the tolerance of opportunistic behaviour represents a expedient strategy for enterprises. It is based on social exchange theory and seeks to answer the research question of “how manufacturers' tolerance of opportunistic behaviour affects economic performance， and how these impacts will change in the context of legal and moral normative elements”. A mixed-methods approach is employed， combining first-hand paired data with second-hand data for empirical testing. This revealed a double-edged effect of manufacturers' tolerance of opportunistic behaviour on its economic performance， manifested as a U-shaped relationship. When the enforcement of contracts by manufacturers is more rigorous and the legal enforcement effectiveness of the region in which the manufacturer is located is more comprehensive， this relationship will become less pronounced. Conversely， when manufacturers have greater trust in their partner enterprises， this relationship will become more pronounced. A theoretical rationale is offered for the tolerance of opportunistic behaviour as a pervasive expedient strategy in channel management practice. Furthermore， it contributes to the existing research literature on response strategies and governance of opportunistic behaviour in channels. It also contributes to the existing body of research on the influence of institutional environmental factors on the variability of channel governance outcomes.

Key words: the tolerance of opportunistic behavior, economic performance, legal norm elements, moral norm elements, social exchange theory