区块链技术下政府对可再生能源电力消纳的动态激励补贴研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.202.2721

Abstract

Abstract:

Renewable energy power consumption is an important way to achieve the China’s “Carbon Neutrality and Carbon Peaking” strategic goal. However， some regions in China only pursue the scale of wind power installation and economic benefits， ignoring the downstream consumption problem， which affects the sustainable development of the wind power industry. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period， China's new energy will grow substantially， and the average annual new installed capacity may double， and the cumulative installed capacity of new energy will account for 40% in 2030， surpassing coal power to become the largest power source. Therefore， China's renewable energy consumption will face greater pressure and challenges，in this paper， for the government’s dynamic incentive problem for power enterprises' renewable energy power consumption under the blockchain technology. Considering the smart contract， energy carbon token and market information disclosure of the blockchain， as well as the government’s carbon trading policy， and based on the state change of the expected consumption amount of renewable energy， the dynamic incentive subsidy models of the government are constructed by using principal-agent theory， including without blockchain， with blockchain and carbon trading under blockchain. The optimal control method is used to solve the equilibrium solution between the government and power enterprises in different situations， and the optimal dynamic trajectory change law of government incentive strategies are revealed， and the effects of relevant parameters， blockchain technology， and carbon trading policy are analyzed.The results suggest that　（1） Only when the opportunity cost of power enterprises is greater than a certain critical point and the fixed cost of blockchain is less than a certain critical point， the implementation of blockchain can help to improve the benefit of the government. （2） Only when the critical value of carbon emission reduction of power enterprises and the unit operation cost of blockchain are small， it is beneficial for the government to start the carbon trading market under the blockchain technology. （3） Under the government's dynamic incentive subsidy， the optimal dynamic trajectory of the expected consumption amount of renewable energy in different scenarios will increase monotonically over time and then tend to a steady state. （4） Finally， the numerical simulation shows that when the conversion rate of carbon emission reduction of power enterprises is relatively high， it is beneficial for the government to regulate and appropriately increase the carbon trading market price. The results provide good insights for the government to design the renewable energy power consumption incentive subsidy for power enterprises under the blockchain technology.

Key words: blockchain technology, power enterprises, renewable energy power consumption, carbon trading, dynamic incentive subsidy

CLC Number:

F224

Zhongmiao Sun, Qi Xu. Dynamic Incentive Subsidy of Government for Renewable Energy Power Consumption under Blockchain Technology[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 346-359.

Figures/Tables 13

References 28

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符号	说明
REC	表示“可再生能源电力消纳”
ε	市场随机扰动因素，ε ~N(0, δ²)
δ²	随机扰动因素的方差
η	电力企业的REC努力成本系数
θ	风险规避程度
σ	可再生能源电力消纳量的衰减率
ρ	贴现率
β	电力企业REC努力对可再生能源电力消纳量的影响因子
g	激励补贴的执行效率
c	激励补贴的单位执行成本
C_b	区块链的单位运作成本
F_b	区块链的固定成本
r	电力用户对区块链能源碳通证的偏好系数
h	单位REC所产生的社会效益的货币表示
ξ	可再生能源电力的市场价格
R₀	电力企业维持传统能源电力的收益
τ	碳交易市场价格
ψ	实现碳交易的碳减排临界值
λ	REC的碳减排转化率
ω	区块链对市场REC信息的披露程度
a	代理人的REC努力水平（决策变量）
b₀	政府支付给电力企业的固定补贴（决策变量）
b₁	政府支付给电力企业的单位补贴（决策变量）
Q	可再生能源电力消纳量
B	政府对电力企业的激励补贴（B=b₀+b₁∙Q）
Π_p	电力企业期望收益
Π_g	政府期望效益
V_p	电力企业期望折现利润
V_g	政府期望效益的折现值

参数		N情形				B情形				TB情形
β	h	EQ^N*	b₀^N*	B^N*	V_g^N*	EQ^B*	b₀^B*	B^B*	V_g^B*	EQ^TB*	b₀^TB*	B^TB*	V_g^TB*
0.39925	1.4925	17.863	1.476	25.806	1.164	22.677	0.431	33.247	1.762	22.733	0.351	33.248	2.581
0.3995	1.4925	17.887	1.426	25.790	1.673	22.701	0.400	33.251	2.066	22.756	0.321	33.252	2.886
0.39975	1.4925	17.910	1.376	25.774	2.182	22.724	0.370	33.256	2.369	22.779	0.290	33.256	3.192
0.4	1.4925	17.933	1.327	25.757	2.691	22.747	0.340	33.260	2.673	22.803	0.260	33.260	3.497
0.4	1.495	17.945	1.274	25.765	3.244	22.774	0.271	33.287	3.376	22.830	0.191	33.287	4.201
0.4	1.4975	17.958	1.222	25.773	3.797	22.802	0.202	33.313	4.079	22.857	0.122	33.314	4.906
0.4	1.5	17.971	1.169	25.780	4.351	22.829	0.133	33.340	4.783	22.885	0.052	33.341	5.612

参数	N情形				B情形				TB情形
ξ	EQ^N*	b₀^N*	B^N*	V_g^N*	EQ^B*	b₀^B*	B^B*	V_g^B*	EQ^TB*	b₀^TB*	B^TB*	V_g^TB*
1.19	17.884	1.525	26.027	0.542	22.692	0.477	33.490	1.234	22.748	0.398	33.491	2.054
1.1925	17.906	1.437	25.965	1.492	22.726	0.391	33.453	2.119	22.782	0.312	33.454	2.941
1.195	17.928	1.348	25.904	2.444	22.761	0.305	33.415	3.006	22.816	0.225	33.416	3.830
1.1975	17.949	1.259	25.842	3.397	22.795	0.219	33.378	3.894	22.850	0.139	33.379	4.720
1.2	17.971	1.169	25.780	4.351	22.829	0.133	33.340	4.783	22.885	0.052	33.341	5.612

参数		N情形				B情形				TB情形
δ²	θ	EQ^N*	b₀^N*	B^N*	V_g^N*	EQ^B*	b₀^B*	B^B*	V_g^B*	EQ^TB*	b₀^TB*	B^TB*	V_g^TB*
1.025²	0.2025	17.937	1.350	25.804	3.471	22.797	0.257	33.354	4.031	22.853	0.177	33.354	4.860
1.05²	0.2025	17.910	1.499	25.823	2.748	22.771	0.359	33.365	3.413	22.827	0.279	33.365	4.241
1.075²	0.2025	17.882	1.650	25.842	2.009	22.745	0.463	33.376	2.781	22.800	0.383	33.376	3.609
1.1²	0.2025	17.854	1.803	25.862	1.255	22.718	0.570	33.387	2.135	22.773	0.490	33.388	2.963
1.1²	0.205	17.846	1.845	25.868	1.048	22.710	0.599	33.390	1.958	22.766	0.519	33.391	2.785
1.1²	0.2075	17.838	1.888	25.873	0.841	22.703	0.628	33.394	1.781	22.758	0.548	33.394	2.608
1.1²	0.21	17.830	1.930	25.878	0.635	22.695	0.657	33.397	1.603	22.751	0.578	33.397	2.431

参数		B情形				TB情形
r	C_b	EQ^B*	b₀^B*	B^B*	V_g^B*	EQ^TB*	b₀^TB*	B^TB*	V_g^TB*
0.097	0.7225	22.516	0.586	33.326	0.225	22.571	0.508	33.327	1.034
0.098	0.7225	22.608	0.465	33.344	1.440	22.664	0.386	33.345	2.255
0.099	0.7225	22.701	0.344	33.361	2.657	22.757	0.264	33.362	3.478
0.1	0.7225	22.794	0.222	33.379	3.876	22.850	0.142	33.380	4.703
0.1	0.725	22.760	0.311	33.417	2.971	22.815	0.231	33.418	3.795
0.1	0.7275	22.725	0.400	33.456	2.067	22.780	0.320	33.457	2.889
0.1	0.73	22.690	0.488	33.494	1.164	22.746	0.409	33.495	1.984

Dynamic Incentive Subsidy of Government for Renewable Energy Power Consumption under Blockchain Technology

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