Abstract:

Remanufacturing offers numerous advantages， including the reduction of natural resource consumption， the mitigation of pollutant emissions， the decrease in carbon emissions， and cost savings. The collection of used products plays a crucial role in remanufacturing and has gained significant attention from both academia and industry. Existing studies primarily focus on a single supply chain member being responsible for product collection. However， in practical scenarios， if a supply chain member solely undertakes the collection process， it will incur substantial costs and result in a low return rate. Therefore， it is essential to extend recycling responsibility to the entire supply chain and enhance the return rate through cooperative collection.Currently， supply chain members engage in cooperative collection through two methods： fund-cooperative and labor-cooperative. Fund-cooperative refers to the manufacturer providing financial support to alleviate the cost burden of the recycler， indirectly influencing the return rate of the supply chain. Labor-cooperative， on the other hand， involves manufacturers participating in collecting activities to assist the recycler in completing challenging tasks such as product transportation and consumer advertising， thereby directly impacting the return rate of the supply chain. For the manufacturer， it is crucial to explore their motivation to support the recycler's collecting activities and determine the most advantageous form of cooperation. A third-party recycler responsible for product collection is considered， with the manufacturer providing either fund-cooperative or labor-cooperative programs to the third party. The main problems addressed in this study are as follows： 1） What are the optimal strategies and profits for the manufacturer， retailer， and third party under different cooperation modes？ 2） How do different cooperation modes affect product return rates， prices， and market demand？ 3） Which cooperation mode is more advantageous for the manufacturer， and how do different cooperation modes impact the retailer and third party？To address these questions， we formulate a dynamic collection differential game model in which the manufacturer provides either fund-cooperative or labor-cooperative to the third party. An open-loop control strategy is employed to determine the optimal strategies and profits under non-cooperative， fund-cooperative， and labor-cooperative modes. By using the non-cooperative mode as a benchmark， the following results are drawn： 1） Cooperative collection consistently contributes to higher collection rates， enabling the manufacturer， retailer， and third party to achieve a Pareto improvement through such collaboration； 2） Compared to fund-cooperative， labor-cooperative is more effective in enhancing the return rate and generating higher profits for the manufacturer； 3） The model is further extended to consider situations where the collection costs of the manufacturer and third party differ. The results indicate that the fund-cooperative mode is more advantageous to the manufacturer only when the collection cost coefficient is relatively higher for the third party. Actively participating in collection activities， rather than solely providing financial support to the third party， proves to be a more effective cooperation mode for the manufacturer.

Key words: dynamic closed-loop supply chain, cooperative collection, third-party collection, fund-cooperative, labor-cooperative