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    Research on Government Subsidy Strategy of Low-carbon Supply Chain Based on Block-chain Technology
    Ling-rong ZHANG,Bo PENG,Chun-qi CHENG
    Chinese Journal of Management Science    2023, 31 (10): 49-60.   DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2362
    Abstract613)   HTML72)    PDF (907KB)(1105)      

    With the continuous progress of China's economy and society, green development has become a national strategy, and carbon emission reduction is an important measure. The government can promote the investment of enterprises' emission reduction technology and increase social welfare through moderate low-carbon subsidies to enterprises. The introduction of block-chain technology into the low-carbon supply chain can improve the coordination degree of low-carbon decision-making among the main bodies of the supply chain and promote the emission reduction of enterprises. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the government subsidy strategy of low-carbon supply chain based on block-chain technology. In this paper, a two-level low-carbon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is taken as the research object, and the government subsidy strategy of the low-carbon supply chain is taken as the research topic. The government invests in the construction of the application platform of block-chain technology, and the supply chain enterprises pay to use the block-chain technology. Under this background, considering consumers' low-carbon preference and green trust, this paper set up before and after the application block chain technology under R&D investment subsidy policy or output subsidy policy of these four situations of three stages Stackelberg game models, in which the government takes the lead and manufacturers and retailers follow and the government to the social welfare maximization as the goal, manufacturers and retailers in order to maximize their own interests as the goal, through comparing the four kinds of situations of the optimal rate of social welfare, carbon reduction and low carbon product production, discusses the government low carbon subsidies strategy of optimal problem. And the validity of the results is verified through the analysis of examples. The results show that when the product of consumers' low-carbon preference coefficient and green trust coefficient is greater than a certain fixed value, the government can obtain higher social welfare through output subsidies, and promote enterprises to reduce emissions more effectively. Governments have been able to boost demand for low-carbon products through output subsidies. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction approaches infinity, the demand for low-carbon products when the government implements output subsidies is 4 times that when the government implements R&D investment subsidies. When the single-cycle cost sharing of block-chain platform and the unit cost of enterprises' application of block-chain technology are less than a certain threshold, the government's construction of block-chain platform can obtain higher social welfare, promote enterprises' emission reduction and improve consumers' demand for low-carbon products. Therefore, the government should increase investment in science and technology, and to make efforts to reduce the block chain platform construction cost and prolong the cycle of block chain platform, for low carbon green products to create a fair, just and open market environment, and control technology of enterprise application block chain unit cost within a reasonable range, encourage enterprises to actively application block chain technology, in order to obtain higher social welfare.

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    Good Shopping DecisionsandBad Shopping Decisions: Research on the Quality Issues and Governance of Internet Celebrity Live Marketing
    Yan-lu GUO,Gong-li LUO,Gui-sheng HOU,Xiao-tong WANG
    Chinese Journal of Management Science    2023, 31 (10): 162-174.   DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1937
    Abstract520)   HTML46)    PDF (1157KB)(1066)      

    With the development and expansion of short video live broadcast platforms, online celebrity live-streaming has become a new form of consumer shopping. However, in this process, the problems of poor quality of products with online celebrities and difficulty in protection have also emerged. Based on this background, a tripartite evolutionary game model is used to study the tripartite strategy selection and evolution of internet celebrities, short video live broadcast platforms, and consumers, and further discusses the impact of changes in live broadcast internet celebrities’ risk attitudes on their efforts to selling goods and select products. The innovations of this article are: ①The dual attributes of consumers and the live broadcast platform are considered. ②The benefits that consumers get from online celebrity products are divided into emotional benefits and functional benefits, which is more in line with the existing empirical evidence and facts, and the conclusion proves that emotional benefits will produce more “negative action” in certain situations. ③In the existing evolutionary game literature, few scholars discuss in detail the changes and transitions of equilibrium points under different parameter conditions, while parameter changes which leads to the transition of the equilibrium point often contains profound policy enlightenment.④The risk attitudes of Internet celebrities on the efforts to bring goods is also discussed,which further explains the causes of the quality problems of products brought by Internet celebrities. In addition, it is also found an interesting insight: consumers' strategy choices when facing the quality trouble of online celebrity live broadcast products will be affected by product types. The higher the functional benefit of the product, the more powerful consumers' motivation to defend their rights. This means that not all products are suitable for online celebrity live broadcast mode for sales.It is found that as the functional benefits that consumers obtain from online celebrity products increase, consumers are more inclined to choose active accountability, and as emotional benefits increase, consumers are more inclined to choose passive accountability, this kind of virtual intimacy on the emotional benefits brought by the products partly explain the phenomenon of the current proliferation of online celebrity product quality problems. Secondly, the influence of basic income parameters on the equilibrium state is far more significant than the influence of coefficient parameters. This should be the focus of supervision. Moreover, consumers’ strategy will be affected by product types when they face the quality problems of online celebrities’ live streaming products. The higher the product’s functional benefits, the greater the motivation for consumers to defend their rights. Finally, the risky attitudes of live streaming internet celebrities will affect their attitudes of product selection. And as the effort to bring goods, risk-averse Internet celebrities' efforts to sell goods and select products are lower than those under certain circumstances.

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