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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (7): 305-315.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1444

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Research on the Pricing Strategy of Community Group Buying Platform Considering UsersAffiliation Situation under Network Externality

Jing Zheng1,2, Yong Wang1,2(), Yue Chen1,2, Yimin Song1,2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China
    2.Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China
  • Received:2022-07-03 Revised:2022-12-22 Online:2025-07-25 Published:2025-08-06
  • Contact: Yong Wang E-mail:wangyongcq@126.com

Abstract:

With the development of e-commerce and the prosperity of platform economy, the traditional retailing industry has suffered a huge impact, and the competition among various industries has become increasingly intensified. As a new retailing model, community group buying has received widespread attention from the society. The outbreak and continuation of COVID-19 makes community group buying one of the most popular O2O shopping patterns. Thus, community group buying is taken as the background, considers the platform network externalities and users' affiliation situation, a two-sided platform game model of community group-buying duopoly competitive market is constructed, and on the in-depth discussion and analysis are carried on to the platform's pricing strategy, market share and platform profit under the competition situation.The main results are as follows: when users are single-homing, the two competitive platforms will share the single users' markets regardless of the changes of bilateral users' preferences and network externalities. The stronger the user's platform preference is, the more inclined to single-homing, and the stronger the network externality is, the more inclined to multi-homing. In different attribution situations, the platform's pricing for consumers will be affected by users' preferences and network externalities. When consumer' preferences exceed a certain threshold, the platform will charge them to increase profits, and otherwise subsidize them to market flow. Under the premise of only considering the consumers' same-side externality and suppliers' cross-side externality, the community group buying platform always adopts a charging strategy for suppliers. When partial suppliers change from single-homing to multi-homing, their market influence increases. Suppliers' preferences will not only affect their own pricing, but also affect the platform's pricing to consumers and platform' profits.

Key words: community group buying, two-sided market, platform competition, network externality, partial multi-homing

CLC Number: