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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 288-298.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1687

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The Source Governance of Plastic Pollution Based on Social Co-governance under the New Version ofPlastic Restriction Order

Dandan Wang1,Lirong Jian1(),Shuaishuai Fu2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
    2.School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2020-09-02 Revised:2021-01-05 Online:2024-01-25 Published:2024-02-08
  • Contact: Lirong Jian E-mail:lr_jian@163.com

Abstract:

The plastic pollution source treatment is a key issue in the policy implementation of the new version of the “plastic limit order”. An evolutionary game model based on government supervision, enterprise transformation production, and public participation in supervision is established in the perspective of social co-governance, in which the impact of the government, the public, and plastic manufacturers on the governance of plastic pollution sources is considered. This model analyzes the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of pollution source treatment problems under four different scenarios. In addition, the numerical simulation is utilized to analyze the decision-making behaviors of various entities in the process of collective treatment of plastic pollution sources. According to the analysis results, some interesting conclusions can be obtained, which are shown as follows: (1) Regardless of the effect of long-term or short-term, the implementation of the new version of the "plastic restriction order” can prompt companies to choose transformation production strategies with the influence of government supervision and public supervision. It also can cut plastic pollution from the source. (2) Higher levels of government regulation can effectively restrain the illegal production behavior of enterprises. On the other hand, the public supervision can effectively restrain the production behavior of enterprises when the government has a negative regulation. (3) Increasing the economic incentives for citizen’s supervision is helpful for improving citizen’s social co-governance level in plastic pollution source treatment process.

Key words: plastic pollution, source governance, social co-governance, evolutionary game

CLC Number: