大学科技城协同创新动态演化博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1616

Abstract

Abstract:

As a major part of the national innovation system， collaborative innovation plays an important role in promoting high-quality economic development and enhancing national and regional innovation capacity. In university science and technology city， there are many innovation subjects， such as universities， research institutes， enterprises， management committees and so on， it gathers international and domestic innovation elements， such as technology， talents， knowledge， capital， etc. As a new organizational model of collaborative innovation， university science and technology city has become a main base for the transformation of scientific research achievements and a sharing platform for the integration of government， enterprise， universities and research institutes， and it is of great significance for promoting the collaborative development of higher education， science and technology innovation and industry. However， the collaborative innovation of university science and technology city is faced with the lack of motivation of innovation subjects， the stagnation of innovation activities， etc. These problems may be caused by the inconsistency of the goals of innovation subjects， the lack of government guidance and supervision， the speculative behavior of innovation subjects， and so on. To solve them， the dynamic evolutionary game model is constructed in the paper. And the cooperation strategy of innovation subject is studied under the condition of supervision and non supervision of government. Matlab is used to simulate the evolution of the main factors affecting the game strategy of collaborative innovation subject. The results show that without supervision from the management committee and other government departments， the interest distribution and the initial state of strategy selection intention of universities and enterprises can effectively promote the convergence of evolutionary game system to the ideal state. When the supervision from management committee is implemented， the supervision measures include the reward and punishment have a significant influence on the strategy selection of cooperative innovation subjects， and which will accelerate the convergence of the evolution results to the ideal state. By the research results， the reference for the collaborative innovation of university science and technology city can be provided， and the theory of collaborative innovation is enriched.

Key words: university science and technology city, evolutionary game, collaborative innovation, replication dynamic equation

CLC Number:

F832.5

Song-liang LI,Peng-fei CHENG. Research on Dynamic Evolution Game of Collaborative Innovation in University Science and Technology City[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(8): 204-213.

Figures/Tables 13

		学研方
		积极合作（ $x$ ）	消极合作（ $1 - x$ ）
企业	积极合作（ $y$ ）	$R 1 + θ L - π C$	$R 1 + K$
	积极合作（ $y$ ）	$R 2 + (1 - θ) L - (1 - π) C$	$R 2 - (1 - π) C - K$
	消极合作（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 1 - π C - K$	$R 1$
	消极合作（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 2 + K$	$R 2$

平衡点	$D e t J 1$	$T r J 1$	稳定性
$O 0,0$	+	-	ESS
$P 1 0,1$	+	+	不稳定
$P 2 1,0$	+	+	不稳定
$P 3 1,1$	+	-	ESS
$P 4 (1 - π) C + K (1 - θ) L, π C + K θ L$	-	0	鞍点

		学研方
		积极合作（ $x$ ）	消极合作（ $1 - x$ ）
企业	积极合作（ $y$ ）	$R 1 + θ L - π C + H$	$R 1 + K - F$
	积极合作（ $y$ ）	$R 2 + (1 - θ) L - (1 - π) C + H$	$R 2 - (1 - π) C - K$
	消极合作（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 1 - π C - K$	$R 1 - F$
	消极合作（ $1 - y$ ）	$R 2 + K - F$	$R 2 - F$

平衡点	$D e t J 2$	$T r J 2$	稳定性
$O 0,0$	+	-	ESS
$Q 1 0,1$	+	+	不稳定
$Q 2 1,0$	+	+	不稳定
$Q 3 1,1$	+	-	ESS
$Q 4 (1 - π) C + K - F (1 - θ) L + H, π C + K - F θ L + H$	-	0	鞍点

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Research on Dynamic Evolution Game of Collaborative Innovation in University Science and Technology City

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Figures/Tables 13

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