双碳视角下代工行业减排策略的多情境三方演化博弈：属地政府VS.外企品牌商

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0873

Abstract

Abstract:

Due to the characteristics of low value-added and high carbon emission， the OEM industry has been regarded as a special group of China's carbon emission reduction work under the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality， especially when the OEMs are restricted by foreign clients and local governments. With the pull and push impacts， how to design the emission reduction strategies and paths for different types of OEMs is an urgent problem to be solved. An evolutionary game model composed of OEMs， foreign clients and local governments is costructed， the complex influencing mechanism of carbon quotas， carbon trading prices， government rewards and punishments， emission reduction technology spillover， technology sharing and corporate reputation on the decision-making of the tripartite gamer is analyzed， the guiding role of precise policies and carbon trading mechanisms in a multi-scenarios emission reduction strategy making situation is explored， and the stability point of the tripartite game system and its evolution process， evolution rate and the motivation of the unstable states are discussed. It is found that：（1） Relying solely either on carbon trading markets or reward and punishment policies poses an impact on emissions reductions within a small range；（2） The difference of reputation loss under the two strategies will reduce the short-sighted behavior and free-riding effect of foreign clients；（3） With the trend toward the medium， the difference of emission reduction and the difference of OEMs’ investment on carbon reduction， the policy range of the government gradually increases；（4） The precise policies of the local pose stronger effects on guiding the emission reduction to a wider range of OEMs and their foreign clients；（5） The increase in the accountability of the foreign clients can not only reduce the risk of financial assistance cheating， but also promote the active emission reduction of OEMs. The best strategy is proposed for the OEM when the local government and foreign client put a pull and push pressure on the OEM’s decision， and a theoretical support and decision basis for the orientation of supply side reform and supply chain reconfiguration is provided.

Key words: OEM, carbon emission reduction strategy, precise reward and punishment, supply chain reconfiguration, tripartite evolutionary game

CLC Number:

C934

Chuan ZHAO, Qi-dong GUO, Min ZUO, Ming-ke HE. Research on Multi-scenario Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Emission Reduction Strategy in OEM Industry under the Situation of Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutralization: Local Government VS. Foreign Clients[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(9): 35-44.

Figures/Tables 15

参数	含义	参数	含义
$e l$	代工厂积极减排的碳排放量	$γ 1$	精准奖惩政策下外企品牌商声誉损失系数
$e h$	代工厂不积极减排的碳排放量	$γ 2$	定额奖惩政策下外企品牌商声誉损失系数
$e 0$	属地政府给予代工厂的额定碳排放量	$α$	代工厂所在地碳交易价格
$Δ e$	代工厂积极减排时属地政府对其奖励的阈值， $Δ e = Δ e, e l ≤ 奖励阈值 0, e l > 奖励阈值$	$P$	定额奖惩下政府对代工厂的定额罚款
$S$	代工厂积极减排所需的研发资金	$ε 1$	政府对代工厂的精准罚款系数
$B$	代工厂不积极减排时的研发资金	$ε 2$	政府对外企品牌商的精准罚款系数
$I e$	外企品牌商给予代工厂的协助资金	$e f$	精准奖惩政策下代工厂不积极减排时的违规排放量
$k$	外企品牌商协助后对不积极减排代工厂的追责比例	$β$	政府碳交易收费系数
$D 1$	代工厂不积极减排、外企品牌商协助时，外企品牌商的声誉损失	$U 1$	代工厂积极减排时政府获得的减排综合收益
$D 2$	代工厂不积极减排、外企品牌商不协助时，外企品牌商的声誉损失	$U 2$	代工厂不积极减排时政府获得的减排综合收益
$t$	代工厂积极减排、外企品牌商协助时，外企品牌商获得的技术共享收益	$x$	代工厂选择积极减排策略的概率
$F$	代工厂积极减排、外企品牌商协助时，政府给予外企品牌商的奖励	$y$	外企品牌商选择协助策略的概率
$I g$	政府对代工厂定额补贴额度	$z$	政府选择实行精准奖惩策略的概率
$θ$	政府精准补贴系数

策略组合	代工厂收益	外企品牌商收益	政府收益
(不积极减排，不协助，定额奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e h) - B - P$	$- (1 + γ 2) D 2$	$U 2 + β α (e h - e 0) + P$
(不积极减排，协助，定额奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e h) + I e - B - P - k I e$	$- (1 + γ 2) D 1 - I e + k I e$	$U 2 + β α (e h - e 0) + P$
(不积极减排，不协助，精准奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e h) - B - ε 1 e f$	$- (1 + γ 1) D 2 - ε 2 e f$	$U 2 + β α (e h - e 0) + (ε 1 + ε 2) e f$
(不积极减排，协助，精准奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e h) + I e - B - ε 1 e f - k I e$	$- (1 + γ 1) D 1 - I e + k I e$	$U 2 + β α (e h - e 0) + ε 1 e f$
(积极减排，不协助，定额奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e l) - S + I g$	$0$	$U 1 + β α (e 0 - e l) - I g$
(积极减排，协助，定额奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e l) + I e - S + I g$	$t - I e$	$U 1 + β α (e 0 - e l) - I g$
(积极减排，不协助，精准奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e l) - S + θ Δ e$	$0$	$U 1 + β α (e 0 - e l) - θ Δ e$
(积极减排，协助，精准奖惩)	$α (e 0 - e l) + I e - S + θ Δ e$	$t + F - I e$	$U 1 + β α (e 0 - e l) - θ Δ e - F$

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Research on Multi-scenario Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Emission Reduction Strategy in OEM Industry under the Situation of Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutralization: Local Government VS. Foreign Clients

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