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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (12): 149-162.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2727

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Blockchain Technology, Supply Chain Networks and Data Sharing: Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

Guo-qiang SUN1(),Yu-fei XIE2   

  1. 1.Research Center of Organization Innovation and Network Governance,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China
    2.School of Management Science and Engineering,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China
  • Received:2022-11-01 Revised:2023-05-15 Online:2023-12-15 Published:2024-01-06
  • Contact: Guo-qiang SUN E-mail:gqsun@163.com

Abstract:

Supply chain networks achieve precise coordination of supply and demand through real-time data sharing, reducing production blindness and mitigating the “bullwhip effect.” They also open up new market opportunities and generate comparative advantages, leading to steady improvements in productivity and breaking the zero-sum game of supply chain relationships. However, potential opportunism risks in actual transactions can result in a high failure rate of supply chain network cooperation, reaching 50%~70%. Therefore, intelligent technology is urgently needed to innovate the digital governance model of supply chain networks, solve data isolation problems and opportunism dilemmas, and promote digital transformation of supply chain networks. A three-party evolutionary game model of government and upstream and downstream subgroups in supply chain networks is constructed to explore the mechanism behind opportunity sharing behavior in supply chain networks and then blockchain technology is introduced to determine the optimal strategy choices of participating entities under different influencing factors. It analyzes the impact of initial willingness, costs, benefits, etc. on the willingness and efficiency of data sharing in supply chain networks and conducts simulation analysis. The results show that, first, under the empowerment of blockchain technology, the initial willingness of the three parties significantly affects the formation of the final stable equilibrium state, which helps to improve the efficiency of data sharing in supply chain networks. Second, increasing the incentive and punishment intensity of data sharing can increase the willingness of upstream and downstream subgroups to share data, while reducing marginal costs and speculative gains can effectively suppress opportunity sharing behavior. Third, when the incentive intensity is greater than the critical value, the government's loose regulation tends to promote data sharing behavior, while when the punishment intensity is lower than the critical value, the government's strict regulation also leads to opportunity sharing behavior, rendering the blockchain regulation ineffective. Finally, the lower the regulatory cost and the more significant the negative and positive social effects, the more the government is inclined to continue to exert supervision efforts. By analyzing the collaborative mechanism of the upstream and downstream subgroups and the government, theoretical support and decision-making basis are provided for digital governance of supply chain networks under the new development pattern.

Key words: supply chain network, blockchain technology, data sharing, evolutionary game, simulation analysis

CLC Number: