工业互联网平台、开发商与企业的三方协作演化策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2558

Abstract

Abstract:

The key to enabling the digital transformation of manufacturing enterprises and promoting the effective and sustainable development of industrial Internet is to effectively grasp the cooperative evolution mechanism between relevant participants of the industrial Internet platform and reveal the influence of different factors on the decision-making behavior of game players.Based on this， a revenue sharing contract between the platform and third-party developers is introduced， and the impact of government subsidies and the risk cost of enterprises joining the platform on the development of industrial Internet platform is taken into account， constructing a three-party evolutionary game model with three stakeholders including manufacturing enterprises， industrial Internet platforms and third-party developers. Lyapunov discriminant method is used to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system under different conditions， and dynamic simulation analysis is conducted on the three-party collaborative strategy under the influence of different factors. The results show that： revenue sharing ratio plays an important role in guiding whether third-party developers choose to cooperate with the platform； the government's subsidy to enterprises and the risk cost of enterprises joining the platform not only affect the enthusiasm of manufacturing enterprises to join the platform， but also affect the cooperation between third-party developers and the platform. In addition， the effective interval of the influencing factors is defined that promote the system evolution to different stable states， providing theoretical reference for manufacturing enterprises， industrial Internet platforms and third-party developers to implement strategies.

Key words: industrial Internet platform, third-party developers, government subsidies, revenue sharing, tripartite evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F424

Xiaoyang Zhou,Zhangzhang Li,Ying Liu,Fan Zhao,Gengzhong Feng,Shouyang Wang. Tripartite Cooperation Evolutionary Strategy of Industrial Internet Platform, Developer and Enterprise: The Role of Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(1): 276-287.

Figures/Tables 15

符号	含义
$i$	$i ∈ (O, G)$ 表示平台优化服务(O)或一般服务(G)
$j$	$j ∈ (C, N)$ 表示第三方开发商与平台合作(C)或不合作(N)
$R m i j$	$i, j$ 情形下企业获得的直接收益
$R m$	企业不加入平台时获得的收益
$c m j$	$j$ 情形下企业加入平台的成本
$d$	企业加入平台可能产生的最大损失成本
$k i j$	$i j$ 情形下企业产生损失的可能性， $k i j ∈ [0,1]$
$α$	政府对企业的补贴力度， $α ∈ [0,1]$
$s m$	政府对企业的最大补贴额
$x$	企业选择“加入平台”策略的概率， $x ∈ [0,1]$
$R p i j$	$i, j$ 情形下平台获得的直接收益， $R p O j > R p G j$
$c p i j$	$i, j$ 情形下平台的开发成本
$β$	政府对平台的补贴力度， $β ∈ [0,1]$
$s p$	政府对平台的最大补贴额
$θ$	收益共享比例， $θ ∈ [0,1]$
$y$	平台选择“优化服务”策略的概率， $y ∈ [0,1]$
$R t i C$	企业加入平台时，第三方开发商与平台合作时的收益
$c t$	第三方开发商与平台合作时的开发成本
$z$	第三方开发商选择“与平台合作”策略的概率， $z ∈ [0,1]$

企业	平台	第三方开发商
企业	平台	合作( $z$ )	不合作( $1 - z$ )
加入平台 ( $x$ )	优化服务( $y$ )	$R m O C - c m C - k O C d + α s m$	$R m O N - c m N - k O N d + α s m$
		$(1 - θ) R p O C - c p O C + β s p$	$R p O N - c p O N + β s p$
		$R t O C + θ R p O C - c t$	$0$
	一般服务( $1 - y$ )	$R m G C - c m C - k G C d + α s m$	$R m G N - c m N - k G N d + α s m$
		$(1 - θ) R p G C - c p G C$	$R p G N - c p G N$
		$R t G C + θ R p G C - c t$	$0$
不加入平台( $1 - x$ )	优化服务( $y$ )	$R m$	$R m$
		$- c p O C + β s p$	$- c p O N + β s p$
		$- c t$	$0$
	一般服务( $1 - y$ )	$R m$	$R m$
		$- c p G C$	$- c p G N$
		$- c t$	$0$

均衡点	特征值 $γ 1$	特征值 $γ 2$	特征值 $γ 3$
E₁(0,0,0)	$- c m N + α s m - R m + R m G N - k G N d$	$β s p + c p G N - c p O N$	$- c t$
E₂(0,0,1)	$- c m C + α s m - R m + R m G C - k G C d$	$β s p + c p G C - c p O C$	$c t$
E₃(0,1,0)	$- c m N + α s m - R m + R m O N - k O N d$	$- (β s p + c p G N - c p O N)$	$- c t$
E₄(0,1,1)	$- c m C + α s m - R m + R m O C - k O C d$	$- (β s p + c p G C - c p O C)$	$c t$
E₅(1,0,0)	$- (- c m N + α s m - R m + R m G N - k G N d)$	$β s p + c p G N - c p O N + R p O N - R p G N$	$- c t + R t G C + θ R p G C$
E₆(1,0,1)	$- (- c m C + α s m - R m + R m G C - k G C d)$	$β s p + c p G C - c p O C + (1 - θ) (R p O C - R p G C)$	$- (- c t + R t G C + θ R p G C)$
E₇(1,1,0)	$- (- c m N + α s m - R m + R m O N - k O N d)$	$- (β s p + c p G N - c p O N + R p O N - R p G N)$	$- c t + R t O C + θ R p O C$
E₈(1,1,1)	$- (- c m C + α s m - R m + R m O C - k O C d)$	$- (β s p + c p G C - c p O C + (1 - θ) (R p O C - R p G C))$	$- (- c t + R t O C + θ R p O C)$

均衡点	特征值 $γ 1$ ， $γ 2$ ， $γ 3$
均衡点	情形1	情形2	情形3	情形4	情形5	情形6
E₁(0,0,0)	- - -	- + -	+ * -	+ * -	+ - -	* + -
E₂(0,0,1)	* * +	* * +	* * +	* * +	+ * +	* * +
E₃(0,1,0)	- + -	- - -	+ * -	+ * -	* + -	+ - -
E₄(0,1,1)	* * +	* * +	* * +	* * +	* * +	+ * +
E₅(1,0,0)	+ * *	+ * *	- - -	- + -	- * +	* * +
E₆(1,0,1)	* + *	* + *	* * +	* * +	- - -	* + -
E₇(1,1,0)	+ * -	+ * -	- + -	- - -	* * +	- * +
E₈(1,1,1)	* - +	* - +	* * +	* * +	* + -	- - -

参数	数值	参数	数值	参数	数值	参数	数值
$R m O C$	30	$R p G C$	70	$k G C$	0.1	$c p G N$	24
$R m O N$	29	$R p G N$	50	$k G N$	0.2	$c t$	40
$R m G C$	27	$R t O C$	35	$c m C$	15	$s m$	18
$R m G N$	25	$R t G C$	20	$c m N$	10	$s p$	40
$R m$	20	$d$	20	$c p O C$	32	$α$	0.6
$R p O C$	75	$k O C$	0.05	$c p O N$	34	$β$	0.4
$R p O N$	65	$k O N$	0.15	$c p G C$	17	$θ$	0.4

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Tripartite Cooperation Evolutionary Strategy of Industrial Internet Platform, Developer and Enterprise: The Role of Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing

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