关键词: 新能源汽车制造商, 补贴主体, stackelberg博弈, 可替代性

Abstract: The New Energy Vehicle industry of China is still in the stage of "Technical and Commercial Demonstration", and government subsidy is an important way to promote the development of New Energy Vehicle industry. Based on the perspective of government intervention of different subsidy bodies,the research on the optimal pricing game strategy of New Energy Vehicle manufacturers can not only promote the government to play a more incentive role with limited financial resources, but also obtain the market operation mechanism under the circumstance of subsidies, so as to improve the development of New Energy Vehicle Industry. According to different subsidy bodies, this paper divides the subsidy policy into manufacturers' subsidy and consumers' subsidy. Assuming there exist price and quality substitute in the products produced by two New Energy Vehicle manufacturers with different technical levels, "price substitute rate" and "quality substitute rate" are introduced to depict the market competition environment. Stackelberg game model is established to describe the influence of government policy and consumer preference on the pricing decision of New Energy Vehicle manufacturers by numerical simulation, which helps get the manufacturer's Pareto optimal decision and propose policy recommendations.
The results show that in the current stage of New Energy Vehicle industry, it's necessary to advocate government subsidies in terms of accelerating the development of New Energy Vehicle industry. Exposed to different subsidies, manufacturers can adopt different pricing strategies to cope with the changes in the market competition environment. Among all subsidies, manufacturers adopt different pricing strategies to cope with the changing competition environment of market. Among them, the quality competition is more conducive for the development of leading manufacturers, and so is price competition to the development of following manufacturers. However, the impact of price competition on manufacturer profits is obviously stronger than that of quality competition. And if consumers pay too much attention to price, it will lead to The Market for Lemons easily. The government should choose different subsidy bodies according to different policy goals. A subsidy for consumers is to raise the price of products so that manufacturers that are started late, smaller, and backward in technology will gain higher profits. It will promote more manufacturers to enter the new energy automotive industry to prevent monopoly. A subsidy for manufacturers is to reduce the product price, and the higher-quality manufacturers can obtain higher profits to encourage manufacturers to increase research and development in order to improve the product quality and guide more consumers to buy high-quality New Energy Vehicles, promoting the survival of the fittest of the New Energy Vehicle industry. The main body of government subsidies should gradually shift from consumers to manufacturers and increase investment, especially in research and development investment for leading New Energy Vehicle manufacturers. Policies can play a part on guiding manufacturers and consumers to attach great importance to improve the quality of New Energy Vehicles and reduce their sensitivity to price so as to promote the healthy development of New Energy Vehicle industry.

Key words: New Energy Vehicle manufacturers, subsidy bodies, Stackelberg game, substitutability