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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 265-275.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2252

• • 上一篇    

基于司机服务努力水平的共享出行平台定价与补贴策略研究

宋亚楠,南瑞娟,谷炜,王道平()   

  1. 北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京 100083
  • 收稿日期:2021-11-02 修回日期:2022-03-23 出版日期:2024-02-25 发布日期:2024-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 王道平 E-mail:dpwang@ustb.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(71902010);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71871017);北京市社会科学基金项目(19GLC063);北京科技大学高水平拔尖人才项目(06500125);中央高校基本科研业务费精品文科项目(FRF-BR-19-004B)

Research on Pricing and Subsidy Strategies of Ride-sharing Platform Based on Driver's Service Effort level

Yanan Song,Ruijuan Nan,Wei Gu,Daoping Wang()   

  1. School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China
  • Received:2021-11-02 Revised:2022-03-23 Online:2024-02-25 Published:2024-03-06
  • Contact: Daoping Wang E-mail:dpwang@ustb.edu.cn

摘要:

共享出行平台的定价与补贴策略是平台运营过程中的重要决策问题。补贴策略可以分为对司机补贴和对乘客补贴,在制定补贴策略时要充分考虑两类补贴策略对司机服务和乘客需求的影响。本文构建了平台为领导者司机为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了共享出行平台的定价和补贴策略,比较分析了平台采取不同补贴策略的均衡结果,结合算例对模型进行了分析。研究发现:当平台收取的佣金比例低于1/3时,平台的最优策略是不进行补贴;当平台收取的佣金比例高于1/3时,平台的最优策略是只对司机补贴;与平台采取不补贴策略相比,平台对司机补贴能够提高司机服务努力水平,增加平台收益;当服务努力水平低于某一阈值时,平台给予司机补贴可以实现平台和司机的双赢,使整体收益接近集中决策的总收益。研究结论为共享出行平台定价和补贴策略提供了参考。

关键词: 共享出行, 努力水平, Stackelberg博弈, 定价, 补贴

Abstract:

The pricing and subsidy strategies of ride-sharing platform are important decision issues in the operation of platform. The subsidy strategies can be divided into subsidy to driver and subsidy to passengers. The influence of the two kinds of subsidy strategies on the service of driver and the demand of passenger should be fully considered when making subsidy strategies. A Stackelberg game model is established in which platform is leader and driver is follower, the pricing and subsidy strategies of ride-sharing platform are studied,the equilibrium results of different subsidy strategies adopted by platform are compare and analyzed, and the analysis of the model is carried out through data simulation. The results show that the optimal strategy of the platform is to adopt non-subsidy strategy when the commission ratio charged by the platform is less than 1/3, and the optimal strategy for the platform is to subsidize to the driver when the commission ratio charged by the platform is more than 1/3. Compared with the platform to adopt non-subsidy strategy, the platform subsidizes to the driver could improve the service effort level of the driver and increase profit of platform. When the efficiency of service is lower than a certain threshold, the platform subsidizes to driver, which could achieve a win-win situation for the platform and the driver, and realize the total profit close to the total profit of centralized decision-making. The research conclusions provide a reference for ride-sharing platform to make pricing and subsidy strategies.

Key words: ride-sharing, effort level, Stackelberg game, pricing, subsidy

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