基于独立售电公司双角色的Stackelberg博弈模型分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1091

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在新一轮电力市场化改革初期，电力市场输配售还处于未完全分开的状态。独立售电公司作为一种双角色主体首先要与电力批发商针对批发价进行博弈，然后与寄生公司进行市场博弈，形成了两阶段的Stackelberg博弈。本文采用逆推法，先用以价格为博弈策略的Bertrand博弈和以零售电量为博弈策略的Cournot博弈对第二阶段的最优目标进行求解，再通过Rubinstein博弈对第一阶段的均衡批发价进行求解。结果表明：在线性需求曲线假定下，独立售电公司如果采用单一的价格博弈手段参与市场，会陷入无限循环的价格调整，最终被迫退出市场；而若采用零售电量为博弈策略，则即使在改革初期寄生公司具有绝对价格优势时，电力市场化依然可以降低均衡电价，提高市场竞争性。

关键词: 售电侧放开；独立售电公司；寄生公司；双角色主体；Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: After the release of the power selling side, the traditional power marketing model changes. As an emerging entity in the power market, the power-selling company becomes an intermediary that sells electricity commodities from power generation companies to end-users, playing the role of agent for a large number of users to participate in the power market. At the present stage, the power selling companies with the background of power distribution generally have a high-quality users and can obtain a lower cost advantage, compared to independent power sales companies, there is an absolute price advantage. Under such circumstances, whether independent power sales companies can participate effectively in the competition and whether the power reform can form a competitive market is worth exploring in depth.

Key words: selling power side release; independent power sales company; parasitic company; Double -Barreled Role; Stackelberg Game

中图分类号:

F272.3

蒲勇健, 余沙, 黄毅祥. 基于独立售电公司双角色的Stackelberg博弈模型分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(12): 317-326.

PU Yong-jian, YU Sha, HUANG Yi-xiang. A Stackelberg Game Model based on the Dual Role of Independent Electricity Sale Company[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(12): 317-326.

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