基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1584

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链，建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型，分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同，将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力，主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作，提高产品质量，使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度，有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。

关键词: 复杂产品, 质量意识, 质量控制, 激励策略, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Incentives play an important role in the cooperation between the pivotal manufacturer and supplier in the quality control process. The pivotal manufacturer usually forms the quality awareness according to the requirement of customers before the production R&D. This paper investigates whether the incentive strategy based on this quality awareness will realize the quality control. Accordingly, a Stackelberg game model consisting of a pivotal manufacturer being the leader and its downstream supplier being the follower is established, and their optimal decisions on the efforts level and the quality level with and without incentives are discussed. The incentive strategy can be divided into two types:the incentive based on the supplier's product quality level and the pivotal manufacturer' quality awareness level. Results show that incentives are the intrinsic motivation for suppliers to promote the collaboration and the product quality. The pivotal manufacturer can further encourage suppliers to be more devoted to improving the product quality by incorporating the quality awareness into the incentive strategy, which enables both parties as well as the whole supply chain to obtain higher profits. In addition, sensitivity analysis shows that collaboration level between two parties and the quality level increase with the level of quality awareness.

Key words: complex products, quality awareness, quality control, incentive strategy, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

F253

张巧可, 陈洪转. 基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(6): 105-114.

ZHANG Qiao-ke, CHEN Hong-zhuan. Incentive Strategy for Complex Product Quality Control Based on Quality Awareness[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(6): 105-114.

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