新零售模式下在线零售商融资均衡与协调策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0001

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对电商平台主导的新零售模式，考虑一个在线零售商和一个第三方物流企业（3PL）组成的二级供应链中，银行或3PL企业为面临资金约束的在线零售商提供融资，建立三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型。研究发现：当在线零售商选择积极型3PL企业融资时，其订购量和系统各参与成员的期望利润更优；当满足协调条件时，若初始资金为常数，3PL企业的利率与运输费之间存在线性递减关系；当满足弱协调条件时，针对不同的初始资金，积极型3PL企业可以设计出多种融资协调合同；资金充足的在线零售商会更偏向协调的积极型3PL企业融资，而不是拒绝任何外部融资。

关键词: 在线零售商, 第三方物流(3PL), Stackelberg博弈, 资金约束, 供应链协调

Abstract: When confronting with a fund shortage problem, the online retailers often use the supply chain financing. As an innovative mode of supply chain financing, the third part logistics (3PL) firm financing service has been practiced in the recent years. Besides, the newsvendor-like the online retailer is capital-constrained and can choose between 3PL firm financing and bank credit financing. Therefore, it is worth to study an equilibrium and coordinating strategy of the supply chain with a limited working capital online retailer under the bank or 3PL firm financing service.
In this paper, it is assumed that the supply chain comprises a capital-constrained online retailer and a 3PL firm, where the online retailer functions as the follower who decides the order quantity and the lender (bank or 3PL firm) functions as the leader who declares the loan interest rate or the 3PL firm's transportation fee. Two financing options (3PL firm financing and bank credit financing) are presented for an online retailer in order to study the interaction of the financing and operating decisions. Our model offers some analyses of the equilibrium and coordination of 3PL firm financing from a supply chain perspective. In the decentralized 3PL firm financing system, the Stackelberg equilibrium and local optimal parameters are obtained.
From the equilibrium and coordinating analyses, it is concluded that the active 3PL firm financing can achieve supply chain financing coordination, yielding a larger order quantity and larger participants' profits than those yielded through BCF, while the conservative may not. When the coordination condition on order quantity is satisfied, if the initial working capital is a constant, there exists a linear decreasing trend between the 3PL firm's loan interest rate and the transportation fee. When the weak coordination conditions are satisfied, the active 3PL firm can offer many coordinated financing contracts, which are applicable to different initial working capital conditions. For achieving supply chain financing coordination, the 3PL firm should be active to adjust his loan interest rate and transportation fee together. Moreover, even if the online retailer has sufficient working capital, he always prefers using the coordinated active 3PL firm financing to refusing any outside financing.

Key words: online retailer, the third logistics(3PL), stackelberg game, capital-constrained, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

F274

李建苗, 李向荣, 张克勇, 郭敏. 新零售模式下在线零售商融资均衡与协调策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(4): 57-69.

LI Jian-miao, LI Xiang-rong, ZHANG Ke-yong, GUO Min. Financing Online Retailers about Equilibrium and Coordinating Strategy under New Retail[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 57-69.

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