中国电力市场长期产业组织架构与电价趋势研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.01.015

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了分析售电侧电力市场化改革背景下中国电力市场长期产业组织架构形态和均衡电价变动趋势，本文根据售电公司在电力批发市场和零售市场的双边讨价还价博弈行为，构建了长期模式下独立售电公司、寄生公司和电力批发商三者之间的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型，结合博弈的均衡状态，比较分析了长期和短期改革效果，并进一步讨论了均衡电价的影响因素和变动情况。结果表明：（1）长期电力市场的均衡批发电价低于完全垄断时期的均衡批发电价，售电侧放开对于降电价效果明显。（2）在改革效果方面，相较于短期改革而言，竞争性的长期改革形态更加有效，长期均衡电价和均衡批发电价随贴现率的波动小于短期，市场更加稳定。（3）在政策实施层面，随着改革推进和竞争程度增加，调整对象从电力批发商逐步过渡到售电公司，有助于保障售电市场竞争的公平和效率。

关键词: 售电侧放开, 电力市场, 长期产业组织, 电价趋势, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The market-oriented reform of power-selling power is regarded as the driving engine to promote a new round of power system reform and optimize the allocation of power resources. At this stage, the power market is in the process of smooth transition from the existing pattern to the marketization, and a series of changes have taken place in the participants, functions and industrial organization forms of the power market. After the dynamic reconstruction of the structure of the power market, it is expected to be in a stable development pattern.
Considering above, the Stackelberg game (leader and follower game) is expanded into a two-stage game to describe the two major market behaviors of the seller in the long-term power market after the liberalization of the selling side in China. In the first phase, the seller negotiates with the wholesaler on a bilateral basis. In the second phase, different electric companies compete for market share in the retail market.Finally, the long-term power market equilibrium is solved by reverse induction, and the numerical simulation is used to compare and analyze the long-term and short-term differences, compare the effects of reform, and put forward corresponding policy suggestions.
Research results show that:(1) The equilibrium wholesale electricity price of the long-term power market is lower than the equilibrium wholesale electricity price in the period of total monopoly. (2) In the reform effect, compared with the short-term reform, the competitive long-term reform pattern is more effective. Specifically, the long-term equilibrium electricity price and the equilibrium wholesale electricity price fluctuate less with the discount rate than the short term. (3) At the policy implementation level, with the reform and the increase of competition, the gradual transition of the object of adjustment from electricity wholesalers to electricity sales companies will help to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the market competition in the sale of electricity.
Due to the lack of sufficient long-term experience in electricity market liberalization, there are certain theoretical and practical requirements for designing models to infer possible long-term market development to support decision-making and policy design. By specifying the profit function of the wholesaler and the selling company, the equilibrium electricity price solution can be obtained directly to see the effect of the selling side liberalization policy. Further research can consider more realistic background and include more parameter variables to better simulate the power market situation.

Key words: selling power side release, retail electricity market, long-term industrial organization, electricity price trends, Stackelberggame

中图分类号:

F272.3

蒲勇健, 余沙, 黄毅祥. 中国电力市场长期产业组织架构与电价趋势研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(1): 158-167.

PU Yong-jian, YU Sha, HUANG Yi-xiang. Long-term Industrial Structure and Electricity Price Trend in China's Power Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(1): 158-167.

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