关键词: Stackelberg博弈模型, 碳标签制度, 决策, 共担契约, 碳减排成本

Abstract: A Stackelberg Game model is built based on a random perspective of market demand and a research is pus forward on two-level supply chain coordination strategy consisting of suppliers and retailers based on the carbon labeling system.Assuming that the market needs random and perfect competition, Stackelberg game model is constructed with the two-level supply chain consisting of suppliers and retailers as the research object. First, the optimal carbon footprint, optimal order batch and maximum objective function of these two factors in decentralized and centralized decision-making are solved. Secondly, it can be seen that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision after the comparison between decentralized decision variables and optimal values of objective functions. Then, on the basis of the centralized decision theory, the cost sharing coefficient variable of reducing carbon footprint and the gain sharing coefficient variable are introduced for two objective functions, and the optimal solution of the coefficient variable of optimal carbon footprint and optimal order batch is obtained. Finally, according to the example analysis and sensitivity analysis, the optimal value of carbon footprint, order quantity and objective function in the case of centralized decision is obviously better than that of decentralized decision. Moreover, the effect of contract decision is equivalent to centralized decision, and the variation range of centralized decision and contract decision is apparently larger than that of two decision variables under decentralized decision. The carbon emission problem is not a zero sum game problem. The carbon footprint is taken as a variable to build the cost sharing and benefit sharing model, which can be regarded as a feasible solution.

Key words: stackelberg game model, carbon labeling system, decision, sharing contract, carbon emission reduction costs