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中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (4): 79-90.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.04.008

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

产能约束下考虑消费者偏好的双渠道供应链决策与协调

龚本刚, 汤家骏, 程晋石, 刘志   

  1. 安徽工程大学管理工程学院, 安徽 芜湖 241000
  • 收稿日期:2017-01-04 修回日期:2018-04-23 出版日期:2019-04-20 发布日期:2019-06-12
  • 通讯作者: 程晋石(1978-),男(汉族),安徽淮南人,安徽工程大学管理工程学院,副教授,硕士生导师,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理,E-mail:cjs@ahpu.edu.cn. E-mail:cjs@ahpu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671001,71771002);安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(1808085MG214)

Decision-making and Coordination of Dual-channel Supply Chain with Consumers' Preference under Capacity Restraint

GONG Ben-gang, TANG Jia-jun, CHENG Jin-shi, LIU Zhi   

  1. School of Management Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China
  • Received:2017-01-04 Revised:2018-04-23 Online:2019-04-20 Published:2019-06-12

摘要: 制造商产能和消费者偏好均会对双渠道供应链成员决策产生影响。考虑消费者渠道和低碳双重偏好,研究产能约束下双渠道供应链成员决策与协调问题。构建集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的双渠道供应链成员决策模型,比较分析两种情形下产能约束、消费者渠道偏好和低碳偏好对供应链决策影响;设计改进的收益共享契约协调机制,证明了其有效性。研究结果表明:在集中决策和分散决策两种情形下消费者渠道偏好对供应链收益都起到促进作用,其中在集中决策下不考虑消费者渠道偏好时供应链收益最少;消费者低碳偏好程度的提高促使两渠道产品销售价格的提高,进而增加供应链收益;在分散决策下随着供应链产能的增大,网络直销渠道具有比传统零售渠道更大的销量增长幅度;设计的协调机制消除了供应链的"双重边际效应",实现帕累托改进。最后通过算例验证以上研究结论。

关键词: 产能约束, 双渠道供应链, 消费者偏好, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Both production capacity constraint of the manufacturer and consumers' channel preference affect the members' decision-makings of dual-channel supply chain. Under capacity constraints, the problem of decision making and coordination of dual-channel supply chain members are studied considering consumer channel and low carbon dual preference in this study. A dual-channel supply chain members' decision model under the cases of centralized and decentralized decision-making is constructed, and the effects of capacity constraints, consumer channel preferences and low carbon preference on supply chain decision-making under the two cases are compared. The improved revenue sharing contract coordination mechanism is designed, and its effectiveness is proved. This study shows that:(1) In the two case, the consumer channel preference plays a promoting role in the supply chain revenue, in which the supply chain's revenue is least when the consumer channel preference is not considered under the centralized decision case. (2) The improvement of consumers' low carbon preference promotes the sales price of two kinds of channels, and then increases the supply chain revenue. (3) Under decentralized decision making, with the increase of supply chain capacity, the network direct selling channel has a larger sales growth rate than the traditional retail channel. (4) The coordination mechanism eliminates the "double marginal effect" and achieves Pareto improvement. Finally, numerical examples are given to verify above conclusions.

Key words: capacity restraint, dual-channel supply chain, consumers' preference, Stackelberg game

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