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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (12): 168-178.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0871

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Research on R&D Investment of Patent under Nonlinear Technology Evolution

ZHAI Dong-sheng, LI Meng-yang, HE Xi-jun, XU Shuo   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
  • Received:2020-05-15 Revised:2020-09-21 Published:2021-12-28
  • Contact: 李梦洋 E-mail:lmy8869@126.com

Abstract: In recent years, the increasingly fierce technology competition in the high-tech industry makes the investment environment of the patent market more complex. However, due to the lack of careful consideration of technical factors, previous scholars’ researches on R&D investment of patent and other patent trading behaviors are difficult to provide a good description of the technical uncertainty and R&D risk for the existing patent investment market.Therefore, the non-linear technology evolution law based on TRIZ theory is introduced into the option game model of patent R&D investment. First, three time-varying functions as model hypotheses based on the description of the non-linear technology evolution law are proposed, which separately characterize the influence of technical uncertainty, R&D risk, and profitability on investment with technology development. Then, the enterprise value functions for the monopoly market and the duopoly market are reconstructed, the real option characteristics of the enterprise under the influence of technology evolution are analyzed, and the optimal timing of the patent R&D investment of enterprises on the timeline of technology evolution and their reactions to technologies with different investment risks are studied through game equilibrium analysis. The results show that: under the condition of non-linear technology evolution, the critical value of enterprises investing in a monopoly market will decrease with the development of technology, which will prompt enterprises to invest in patents with high technological risks in advance; in the duopoly competitive market, enterprises will choose to abandon its option value to be the leader, advance their investment to the early stage of technology development with lower patent value, and form a non-Pareto optimal simultaneous investment balance; besides, enterprises maybe show the preference for investment on technology with high-risk and high-profitability. The conclusion of this paper explains the motivation of current high-tech enterprises to make high R&D investments in the early stage of technology development, discusses how the nature of technology affects investment decisions, and provides suggestions for enterprises facing similar investment problems in reality.

Key words: non-linear technology evolution; R&D investment of patent; option game; TRIZ theory

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