复杂产品研发网络中企业技术创新行为动态演化研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1296

Abstract

Abstract:

Under the dual incentive of marketization and specialization， enterprises gradually become the main carrier of key technology breakthrough in complex product R&D network. Based on two important technological innovation modes， namely technology imitative innovation and technology collaborative innovation， an evolutionary game model of technological innovation of R&D enterprises in complex product R&D network is constructed under the lack of government role and with government subsidy supervision， considering the factors of technological innovation conversion rate， technology quantity and policy tools， studying the effect of policy tools on the evolution of technology imitation innovation to technology collaborative innovation of R&D enterprises in complex product R&D network. The dynamic evolution of technology innovation behavior and its influencing factors through simulation are also researched. The results show that government tools are inevitable in the development of complex products； Government regulation and punishment can promote R&D enterprises to choose technology collaborative innovation； However， whether the core technology competitiveness of R&D enterprises significantly improves or not still needs further verification.

Key words: complex product R&D network, technological imitative innovation, technological collaborative innovation, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F273.1

Naiding Yang,Yu Wang,Yan Wang,Yanlu Zhang. Evolutionary Game on Technological Innovation of Enterprises in Complex Product R&D Network[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(2): 242-253.

Figures/Tables 14

	研发主体j
	技术协同创新y		技术模仿创新1-y
研发主体i	技术协同创新x	$A 1 P 1 - β C - M$	$π - β C - M$
	技术协同创新x	$A 2 P 1 - β C - M$	$T 2 P 2 + N - C ι$
	技术模仿创新1-x	$T 1 P 2 + N - C ι$	$T 1 P 2 - C ι$
	技术模仿创新1-x	$π - β C - M$	$T 2 P 2 - C ι$

	研发主体j
	技术协同创新y		技术模仿创新1-y
研发主体i	技术协同创新x	$A 1 P 1 + (a - 1) (β C + M) + A 1 B$	$π + (a - 1) (β C + M)$
	技术协同创新x	$A 2 P 1 + (a - 1) (β C + M) + A 2 B$	$T 2 P 2 + N - C i - m D$
	技术模仿创新1-x	$T 1 P 2 + N - C i - m D$	$T 1 P 2 - C i$
	技术模仿创新1-x	$π + (a - 1) (β C + M)$	$T 2 P 2 - C i$

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均衡点	Det(J)	Tr(J)	局部稳定性
(0,0)	+	-	ESS
(0,1)	+	+	不稳定
(1,0)	+	+	不稳定
(1,1)	+	-	ESS
(x^, y^)	-	0	鞍点

均衡点	Det(J)	Tr(J)	局部稳定性
(0,0)	+	-	ESS
(0,1)	+	+	不稳定
(1,0)	+	+	不稳定
(1,1)	+	-	ESS
(x^, y^)	-	0	鞍点

参数	参数说明	赋值	参数	参数说明	赋值
A₁	主体i的技术协同创新转化系数	0.2	A₂	主体j的技术协同创新转化系数	0.18
T₁	主体i的技术模仿创新转化系数	0.8	T₂	主体j的技术模仿创新转化系数	0.72
P₁	技术协同创新产生的技术量	20	P₂	技术模仿创新产生的技术量	10
π	创新行为产生的基本收益	1	C	协同创新初始成本	10
N	搭便车收益	0.5	M	协同创新维护成本	5
β	初始障碍因子	0.5	C_i	技术模仿创新成本	5

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Evolutionary Game on Technological Innovation of Enterprises in Complex Product R&D Network

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