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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (4): 293-305.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1185

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Optimization of Emission Reducing and Pricing Decisions Based on Differentiated Green Preference and Carbon Constraints under Information Asymmetry

Jing Li1,Jiaping Xie2(),Aisaiti Gulizhaer2,3   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201701, China
    2.School of Business, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
    3.School of Business Administration, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi 830012, China
  • Received:2021-06-14 Revised:2021-09-20 Online:2024-04-25 Published:2024-04-25
  • Contact: Jiaping Xie E-mail:jiaping@mail.shufe.edu.cn

Abstract:

The rapid development of human society brings about the continuous deterioration of the environment, leading many countries put the green development on the agenda. Enterprises should concurrently satisfy the carbon policy constraints and consumer behavior in order to achieve sustained development. Therefore, it is important to optimize the pricing and emission reduction strategy for firms and the carbon policy decision-making for government under various market structures.Based on consumer preference differentiation and information asymmetry, a two-stage game theory model consists of strategic consumers, emission-constraint enterprise and government is built: Firstly, the enterprise’s decisions on emission reducing and pricing is optimized by adverse selection method; Then the carbon policies are designed which can improve both economic and environmental benefits for government; Ultimately, the results are simulated under three market structures.(1) When there are more green consumers in the market, the carbon trading price increases with the growth of green preference, while when less green consumers, the trading price decreases; (2) The carbon reduction degree will be raised with the improvement of reduction technology and the aggravation of information barrier. When marginal reduction cost is high, the government should increase carbon quota, reduce carbon price or implement stricter labeling policy. (3) When the government implements carbon policies for high-pollution enterprise, the carbon quota should be reduced with the aim of higher reduction degree and less product differentiation. Otherwise, the carbon constraint should be relaxed and trading price should be increased with the goal of higher social welfare. (4) In order to stimulate emission reduction, the government should raise the carbon trading price in a low-preference and normal-preference market, and reduce the price in a similar-preference market. On the other hand, in order to optimize the enterprise’s profit, the government should control the trading price higher or lower than a certain value in a low-preference market, increase the carbon price in a similar-preference market and decrease the price in a normal-preference market.

Key words: carbon emission reduction, carbon policies, differentiated green demand, information asymmetry

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