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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 340-354.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1828

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Decision-making Analysis of Power Battery Recycling under Carbon Cap-and-trade Mechanism and Subsidy Policy

Wenqi Wu, Ming Zhang()   

  1. School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China
  • Received:2023-11-02 Revised:2024-04-26 Online:2025-08-25 Published:2025-09-10
  • Contact: Ming Zhang E-mail:zhangmingdlut@163.com

Abstract:

To promote the power battery recycling work and promote the carbon emission reduction of enterprises, the government launched carbon cap-and-trade mechanism and subsidy policy, to explore the impact of the government subsidy strategy choice on the decision-making of the power battery recycling supply chain under cap-and-trade mechanism, a closed-loop supply chain led by power battery manufacturer and composed of the vehicle manufacturer and third-party recycler is constructed, and the optimal decision-making of the power battery recycling supply chain under the three strategies of subsidized power battery manufacturer is studied. In addition, three recycling models are constructed: single-channel monopoly recycling, mixed recycling and alliance recycling, and the supply chain decision-making, profit and recycling rate under different recycling models are compared. Results show that (1) The forward supply chain decision of power battery recycling is affected by the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism and recycling models, while the subsidy policy only affects the reverse supply chain decision; (2) The carbon cap-and-trade mechanism improves the profits of the power battery recycling supply chain, showing that the increase of carbon quota and carbon price is conducive to the increase of the profit of the power battery recycling supply chain, while the increase of carbon price leads to poor recovery performance; (3) Subsidy policies improve supply chain profits and recycling rates, and the recycling rate of subsidized power battery manufacturers or recyclers is always better than that of subsidized consumers; (4) The impact of carbon cap-and-trade mechanism and subsidy policy on the supply chain is not affected by the recycling mode, but the supply chain profit and recovery rate of the alliance recycling mode are better than that of single-channel recycling and mixed recycling.

Key words: power battery recycling, closed-loop supply chain, recycling model, cap-and-trade mechanism, government subsidy

CLC Number: