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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 184-195.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2221

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Selection of Hybrid Channel Recycling Modes and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions for the Electric Vehicle Battery Manufacturer

Chuan Zhang(),Yuxin Tian,Mengyu Cui   

  1. School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China
  • Received:2022-10-12 Revised:2023-08-12 Online:2024-06-25 Published:2024-07-03
  • Contact: Chuan Zhang E-mail:czhang@mail.neu.edu.cn

Abstract:

The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) in China has led to a substantial number of power battery retirements. Establishing an efficient recycling mechanism for these spent power batteries is of pivotal importance. It delves into the selection of recycling modes and the determination of carbon abatement strategies within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) governing EV power batteries, operating under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. Four hybrid channel recycling modes are proposed: (1) joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the retailer; (2) joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the third-party recycler; (3) joint recycling involving the retailer and the third-party recycler; (4) joint recycling involving the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party recycler. The Stackelberg game model is employed to derive optimal pricing decisions, maximum profits, and carbon emission reduction strategies for different modes. A comparative analysis of optimal profits across distinct modes is performed. In addition, an exhaustive exploration of the influences of pivotal parameters on equilibrium outcomes is conducted.The results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction level for the manufacturer decreases with increasing initial carbon emissions, decreases with a higher carbon emission reduction investment coefficient, and exhibits an initial rise followed by a decline and then another rise with increasing unit carbon trading price. When the sensitivity coefficient of the recycling price exceeds a specific threshold and the competition coefficient of recycling falls below another threshold, the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer involves joint participation of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party recycler. Otherwise, the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer includes joint participation by the manufacturer and the retailer, or by the manufacturer and the third-party recycler. The total collecting quantity of retired power batteries in the CLSC diminishes as the competitive coefficient of recycling channels increases, while it rises with an increase in the consumer sensitivity coefficient to recycling prices. It contributes to enhancing the power battery recycling and utilization system for EVs in China, enriching the existing research pertaining to CLSCs for EV power batteries under carbon policies, thereby providing substantive insights for operational decision-making of EV battery manufacturers.

Key words: carbon cap-and-trade policy, electric vehicle power battery, closed-loop supply chain, carbon emission reduction, hybrid channel recycling

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