Abstract:

With the development of behavioral economics， decision-makers pay more attention to the application of behavioral preference in supply chain management. However， the existing researches on supply chain management considering behavioral preferences usually only consider a single behavioral preference， without considering the superimposed effect of multiple behavioral preferences. But many behavioral experiments and researches have confirmed that decision-making models based on rational assumptions deviate from reality. And the complexity of human behavior means that people may have multiple behavioral preferences. In particular， the disadvantaged decision-makers will pay more attention to fairness and be more sensitive to their own losses. Therefore， the dual behavioral preference of the retailers with the inferior position of supply chain is introduced into the multi-echelon closed-loop supply chain composed of the manufacturers， the remanufacturers， the distributors and the retailers. Furthermore， considering that with the maturity of remanufacturing technology， the advantages of the remanufacturers are increasingly prominent， but due to the lack of market advantages， the remanufacturers often choose to cooperate with other enterprises to maximize profits when carrying out remanufacturing business. However， there is a gap in the research on the cooperation between the manufacturers and remanufacturers under the consideration of behavioral preferences. Based on this， under the supervision of carbon tax， the multi-echelon closed-loop supply chain game models of cooperation and non-cooperation between the manufacturers and remanufacturers are established， namely Model CD and Model MT. Then the influence of the retailers' dual behavioral preferences on pricing decisions of each member in the supply chain is discussed， and equilibrium analysis and comparison are conducted. The main discussions are as follows： （1） The influence of the retailers' dual behavioral preferences on the pricing of new and remanufactured products when the fair gain and loss coefficients meet different conditions； （2） The influence of carbon emission saved by remanufactured products on the pricing of new and remanufactured products； （3） The impact of carbon tax imposed by the government on the manufacturers and remanufacturers on the pricing of new and remanufactured products. The results are showed as follows： （1） the cooperation between the manufacturers and remanufacturers reduces the price of remanufactured products， but does not affect the price of new products. （2） When the retailer's profit is higher than the manufacturer's profit at the reference point， the retailer's negative inequality and loss aversion preference decrease， but positive inequality preference increases， so the upstream enterprises raise the wholesale price of products. On the contrary， the upstream enterprises reduce wholesale prices. （3） The carbon tax levied by the government increases the price of new products， reduces new products’ production and the carbon emission of the supply chain system. In addition， when the carbon emission saved by remanufacturing is large， the remanufacturer can increase the production of remanufactured products and the manufacturer can reduce the production of new products. In this case， appropriate carbon tax will encourage enterprises to actively remanufacture. The dual behavioral preferences are considered to make the research more practical. In addition， the carbon tax policy and remanufacturing considered in this paper are in line with the current green development policy， and the conclusions drawn can provide theoretical basis for the government to formulate a reasonable carbon tax policy to reduce carbon emissions and enterprises to make targeted decisions.

Key words: remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, dual behavior preferences, cooperation, carbon tax, Stackelberg game