Abstract:

With technological advancement and increasing health awareness among users， consumers' consumption habits in the medical and health field have gradually shifted from offline to online. In order to seek new profit growth points and cope with the increasingly fierce market environment， pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms have partnered with small offline medical institutions to provide customers with convenient services of "online ordering and offline pickup" and achieve logistics collaboration. By establishing a Stackelberg game model for the collaborative distribution between pharmaceutical e-commerce and small offline medical institutions， the latter first decides the profit-sharing ratio， and then the former decides the delivery price and delivery period， achieving the optimal income-sharing ratio， price， and delivery cycle for both offline medical institutions and pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms. Through the analysis of historical orders， the stochastic demand is characterized by an additive model. The results show that pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms are more sensitive to market parameters （such as potential market size and price elasticity） in their price decisions， while delivery period decisions are more sensitive to logistics parameters （such as order volume and unit transportation cost）. It is found that when small medical institutions choose a dynamic profit-sharing strategy， although they can achieve their own profit maximization， it significantly reduces the overall profit of the supply chain. Therefore， pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms need to focus on improving their operational capabilities while paying attention to the market environment. Moreover， when cooperating with offline medical institutions， they need to reach a suitable profit-sharing ratio as early as possible， so as to achieve supply chain coordination on the basis of win-win.

Key words: medical e-commerce, collaborative distribution, pricing decision, distribution cycle decision, revenue sharing