Abstract:

Aiming at a closed-loop supply chain （CLSC） in which a manufacturer holds corporate social responsibility （CSR） and commits the collection of used products to the retailer， a centralized and a decentralized decision-making models are constructed to study the optimal pricing of new products， CSR investment， and collection rate decision-making issues， and the impact of the transfer price of used products on the equilibrium decisions and profit of each player in the CLSC is discussed. Then， a revenue sharing contract model based on Nash bargaining and a two-part tariff contract model are constructed， and the coordination effect of the two contracts is explored considering the influence of the manufacturer’s bargaining power， unit cost savings from recycling， consumers’ sensitivity coefficient on the CSR effort level and CSR investment scale coefficient， and then the advantage of two contracts is compared from the economic perspective of different channel players. Results show that if the manufacturer transfers all cost savings from recycling used products to the retailer， the CSR performance， collection rate， the profits of each player and channel can be maximized in a decentralized-decision situation without coordination contract. The revenue sharing contract based on Nash bargaining can attain partial coordination and the coordination effect increases in the bargaining power of the leader of the CLSC. The two-part tariff contract can coordinate the CLSC completely， and appropriate fixed fees can make the two-part tariff contract become a common choice of the players compared to the revenue sharing contract. However， when the economic benefit of the manufacturer’s CSR commitment is beyond a certain threshold， the difficulty of complete coordination of the two-part tariff contract increases（decreases） in the CSR investment scale coefficient （consumers’ sensitivity coefficient on the CSR effort level）.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, corporate social responsibility, pricing decision, revenue sharing contract, two-part tariff contract