基于循环经济模式的政府激励与监督问题

Abstract

Abstract: In order to study how government induces enterprises put reverse logistics strategy in practice based on cycle economy pattern,this paper designs an incentive and monitor model for them under asymmetrical information,and analyzes how government and enterprises make the optional contract as information is asymmetrical,as well as government how to select the effective and feasible monitoring effort.The result provides a theoretic support for government to design the policy to inspirit and monitor enterprises in practising the reverse logistics strategy.

Key words: cycle economy pattern, reverse logistics, principal-agent, incentive contract, monitoring

CLC Number:

C939

ZHANG Bao-yin, WANG Bo, WU Yu. Incentive and Monitor Problems of Government Based on Cycle Economy Pattern[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (1): 136-141.

References

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Incentive and Monitor Problems of Government Based on Cycle Economy Pattern

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