Abstract: Power rent-seeking in the field of poverty alleviation not only causes huge losses to the national financial funds, but also affects the credibility of the government in the eyes of the public. Therefore, it is an important topic worthy of attention and research. In this paper, a setting is considered in which a village cadre obtains poverty alleviation funds and distribute them to poor villager. The government will monitor to prevent the village cadre from being bribed to distribute poverty alleviation funds to fake poor or real poor. The village cadre has two-dimensional private information about his own type (rent or not rent) and about the villagers’ condition (real poor or fake poor). A game-theoretic model is developed to investigate the strategies of villagers’ rent competition, the probability of village cadre’s rent-seeking and the utility of the government. The results show that villagers’ rent-seeking strategies will affect the rent-seeking probability of village cadre. With the strengthening of monitoring, higher rent provided by villagers will still increase the rent-seeking probability of village cadre; After the rating promotion mechanism is proposed, even if the villagers provide higher rent, the rent-seeking behavior of the village cadre can be effectively reduced. In addition, some effective suggestions on how the government should set the optimal monitoring are provided.

Key words: poverty alleviation; power rent-seeking; incomplete information; monitoring