主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (2): 158-169.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.02.016

• Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction under Environmental Regulation

WANG Ming-yue1, LIU Yu1,2, YANG Wen-ke3   

  1. 1. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;
    2. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
    3. Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China
  • Received:2017-11-29 Revised:2018-04-14 Online:2019-02-20 Published:2019-04-24

Abstract: It is a key step to reduce the influence of externality by coordinating the interests of the subjects in the agglomeration space and promoting interregional cooperation. Through the construction of the intergovernmental emission reduction evolutionary game model, the local government in the region under the conditions of independent emission reduction, cooperative emission reduction and environmental regulation in the region under the local government independent emission reduction strategy selection process of evolution. The study found that:(1) when the level of economic development of local government and external government are relatively small, whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction, {reduction, reduction} is local government stability strategy, however the mitigation effect is not significant; (2) In the case of independent emission reduction, when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree, {emission reduction, non-emission reduction} or {non-emission reduction, emission reduction} is stability strategy of the system; (3) In the case of cooperative emission reduction, when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs, with the local government economic development, local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not. If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost, the optimization of resources were achieved, reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions, improve the willingness of reduce emissions. (4) Due to the special characteristics of carbon emissions space product attributes, environmental regulation can't play a good effect, only in the economic backward areas can make sense, the emission reduction effect is not significant. Finally, the validity of the model is verified through a numerical simulation. By improving synergies, or reducing transaction costs, promote regional cooperation in emission reduction has great significance to achieve emission reduction targets.

Key words: environmental regulation, regional cooperation, carbon emission reduction, evolutionary game theory

CLC Number: