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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (7): 138-149.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1576

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Yield or Go?Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pedestrian and Autonomous Vehicle Conflicts

Xusheng Yao1,Shoufeng Ma1,Shunqiang Ye2(),Shuai Ling1   

  1. 1.College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
    2.School of Management, Anhui University, Hefei 230601, China
  • Received:2021-08-10 Revised:2021-11-28 Online:2024-07-25 Published:2024-08-07
  • Contact: Shunqiang Ye E-mail:sqye@ahu.edu.cn

Abstract:

Over recent years, traffic authorities in many countries have begun to approve autonomous vehicles for real-world road testing, and autonomous vehicles are gradually becoming one of the real travel options. However, the full realization of driverless is a gradual process, during which there will inevitably be a mixed situation of multiple forms of traffic. The most complex issue in this context is the interaction with pedestrians, a vulnerable traffic segment. Their movement trajectories are rather random and their actions are difficult to predict, which may lead to an increase in traffic accidents and cause considerable difficulties in traffic management. Considering that autonomous vehicles are different from traditional vehicles, it takes time for pedestrians to accept and adapt to autonomous vehicles, and autonomous vehicles also need to constantly update and optimize their strategies in the interaction with other traffic agents. Therefore, it is an urgent and important issue to analyze the pedestrian-vehicle interaction mechanism under driverless scenario from the perspective of evolutionary game and propose appropriate solutions to improve the traffic efficiency. Specifically, the crossing behavior of autonomous vehicles and pedestrians at unsignalized intersections is analyzed, and concepts are introduced such as pedestrians’ trust of driverless, loss spillover of autonomous vehicle conflict, and communication between pedestrians and vehicles. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, a game matrix between the two parties is constructed. Then a dynamic model of the mutual evolution was established, and conclusively the stable strategies of the two parties' crossing behavior were obtained. The results show that the strategy choice of pedestrians and autonomous vehicles is closely related to the level of pedestrians’ trust of driverless and loss spillover of autonomous vehicle conflict. Under different parameter conditions, the system has multiple stable equilibriums. Besides, the introduction of the communication mechanism can eliminate the negative effects brought about by technological distrust to a certain extent, and promote the evolution of the game in the direction of the goal. Finally, the validity of the model is verified through simulation and gives management implications to promote the development of driverless. Managerial insights are provided from three perspectives: technology advocacy, media coverage and standard setting, with the aim of shedding new lights on the development of the autonomous vehicles industry.

Key words: conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles, evolutionary game theory, autonomous vehicles, trust, communication

CLC Number: