Abstract:

With the rapid development of the economy， a significant increase in carbon emissions， and environment pollution issues have become increasingly serious. With the increasing emphasis on low-carbon economy， governments have implemented many carbon emission policies， such as carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies. In addition， emerging technologies are constantly evolving， such as a blockchain technology， which can promote information sharing due to its decentralized and transparent characteristics. When facing carbon emission regulations， more and more manufacturers are conducting low-carbon technology research and development （R&D） to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. However， low-carbon technology R&D requires long-term investment. Collaborative R&D of low-carbon technology among manufacturers is an effective way to not only save costs but also accelerate technological innovation in emission reduction. For example， in order to comply with stricter carbon emission controls， Volkswagen and Toyota share the technological R&D costs and are collaborating to develop battery electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles. Therefore， in the low-carbon market empowered by blockchain technology， it is worthwhile to explore how manufacturers make production and emission reduction strategies when facing carbon emission regulations.A noncooperative-cooperative biform game model is constructed to examine the issues of simultaneous production competition and technology cooperation on carbon emission reduction （CER） between two manufacturers with different CER efficiency. Firstly， the production competition between two manufacturers is considered as a noncooperative game. Secondly， two manufacturers collaborate on emission reduction technology to share the investments， which can be considered as a cooperative game. The characteristic function of the cooperative game coalition is determined using maximum and minimum theorem. The profits of the coalition are distributed by using the Shapley value. Then， the profits of two manufacturers are obtained by the Nash equilibrium. In conclusion， the optimal solutions of noncooperative-cooperative biform game are determined， which includes optimal production， CER level， profit of each manufacturer， and emission reduction investment sharing ratio. Finally， how parameters such as blockchain operation cost， carbon price and emission reduction efficiency affect two manufacturers' optimal strategies is explored. The following results are found：The noncooperative-cooperative biform game not only solves the optimal operational strategies in the supply chain， but also coordinates the supply chain at the same time. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is at a certain threshold， as the increase of blockchain operation cost， manufacturers will increase production and emission reduction level， and the manufacturer with high CER efficiency and manufacturer with low CER efficiency improve CER efficiency will expand the threshold. The change of carbon price has different impacts on manufacturers with different CER efficiency. The manufacturer with high CER efficiency benefits from higher carbon price， and can make comprehensive decisions by weighing “carbon revenue”， sales profit， market share and other factors.

Key words: blockchain technology, noncooperative-cooperative biform game, supply chain coordination, emission reduction technology