[1] 何丽红, 廖茜, 刘蒙蒙等. 两层供应链系统最优广告努力水平与直接价格折扣的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(2):130-138. [2] 孙浩, 叶俊, 胡劲松等. 不同决策模式下制造商与再制造商的博弈策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(1):160-169. [3] Brandenburger A, Stuart H. Biform games[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(4):537-549. [4] Anupindi R, Bassok Y, Zemel E. A general framework for the study of decentralized distribution systems[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2001, 3(4):349-368. [5] Granot D, Sošić G. A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution system of retailers[J]. Operations Research. 2003, 51(5):771-784. [6] Stuart H. Biform analysis of inventory competition[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2005, 7(4):347-359. [7] Plambeck E L, Taylor T A. Sell the plant? The impact of contract manufacturing on innovation, capacity, and profitability[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(1):133-150. [8] Feess E, Thun J H. Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains:A biform-game analysis[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 234(3):763-773. [9] 郑士源. 合作博弈理论的研究进展——联盟的形成机制及稳定性研究综述[J]. 上海海事大学学报, 2011, 32(4):53-59. [10] 谭伟, 谭德庆. 基于共识程度的双体博弈纳什均衡拓展研究[J]. 管理学报, 2011, 8(2):306-310. [11] 杜义飞. 创新者最优许可数量决策与信心指数调节作用[J]. 控制与决策, 2013, 28(5):753-762. [12] Casajus A, Huettner F. Null, nullifying, or dummifying players:The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value[J]. Economics Letters, 2014, 122(2):167-169. [13] Eda K Z, John J. B, III. Centralizing inventory in supply chains by using Shapley value to allocate the profits[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2011, 13(2):146-162. [14] Marcin M. "Procedural" values for cooperative games[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, 42(1):305-324. [15] Wang Wenna, Sun Hao, Xu Genjiu. Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the egalitarian Shapley values[J]. Operations Research Letters, 2017, 45(2):164-169. [16] Yokote K, Funaki Y, Kamijo Y. A new basis and the Shapley value[J]. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 80:21-24. [17] Jeong H, Ha S, Kim H. Flood protection cost allocation using cooperative game theory for adapting infrastructure to climate change[J]. Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management, 2018, 144(4):1-12. [18] Hu Xunfeng, Li Dengfeng. A new axiomatization of the shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure[J]. Operations Research Letters, 2018, 46(2):163-167. |