Abstract: As the allocation problem in practical management problem is studied by cooperative game theory, there exist some unimportant coalitions or invalid coalitions, which affect the fairness and rationality of the allocation. For example, the joint investment problem: if the three enterprises which are denoted as enterprise 1, enterprise 2 and enterprise 3, they partly participate in the joint investment in H company due to the consideration of risk, while enterprise 2 can provide the H company with advanced technology at the same time. If only enterprise 1 and enterprise 3 participate in the cooperation, the characteristic function value of the coalition {1,3} is far less than coalitions {1,2} and {2,3}， so the coalition {1,3} will not be given firstly priority in the cooperation, which is a cooperative game with priority coalitions. However, these coalitions in cooperative games are treated equally solving by some exiting solutions such as core, Shapley value and the least square pre-nucleolus, which cannot reflect the different importance of the coalitions in the cooperation. Thus, it is necessary to find a new solution to consider the importance of coalitions.

Key words: fuzzy cooperative game; multi-priority goal programming model; priority factors of coalitions; core