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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 301-311.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2070

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Joint Decision of Freshness-keeping Effort and Promotion Effort in a Dual-channel Fresh Produce Supply Chain from a Dynamic Perspective

Wenlong Wang1(), Zhuyun He2, Suxian Zhang2   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management,Northwest A&F University,Yangling 712100,China
    2.School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an 710055,China
  • Received:2022-09-21 Revised:2023-05-16 Online:2025-09-25 Published:2025-09-29
  • Contact: Wenlong Wang E-mail:wl.wang@nwafu.edu.cn

Abstract:

With the implementation of the project of “promoting agriculture through digital commerce”, the fresh e-commerce market in China is growing rapidly. In a dual channel supply chain, a supplier usually needs to dynamically adjust environmental factors in storage, transportation and distribution over time according to the current freshness level of fresh products, that is, to make dynamic freshness-keeping efforts. At the same time, as an effective means to stimulate consumers to buy quickly, promotion is an important decision for a retailer to attract consumers. It is worth noting that in order to cope with the dynamic changes in freshness of fresh products, the retailer needs to make dynamic promotion efforts to maximize profit. Therefore, the freshness-keeping efforts of the supplier and the promotion efforts of the retailer will jointly affect the operation performance of a fresh supply chain.Under this background, based on the dynamic perspective of time dimension, the supplier’s freshness-keeping efforts and retailer's promotion efforts, and the multiple effects of product freshness, goodwill and price on market demand are considered. Focusing on a dual channel supply chain of fresh products in which the supplier has both online and offline channels, a differential game model is constructed, and the optimal control theory is used to solve the dynamic joint decisions of supply chain members under centralized and decentralized decisions. A revenue sharing contract is designed to optimize supplier’s freshness-keeping efforts and retailer's promotion efforts and improve the performance of the supply chain.The results show that (1) Under the three decision-making situations, the freshness level of fresh food is monotonically increasing, however, the changes of goodwill are diversified. In addition, the profits of the supplier and the retailer will increase to a stable state over time, and at this time, they are the highest under the centralized decision-making situation, higher under the revenue sharing contract, and the lowest under the decentralized decision-making situation. (2) Under centralized decision making, the optimal level of promotional efforts and the optimal level of freshness-keeping efforts increase with market demand, consumer freshness preference and brand preference, and decrease with the decaying degree of product goodwill and input cost. (3) Under decentralized decision-making, the market share of traditional channel has a positive impact on retailer's promotion efforts, and a negative impact on supplier's freshness-keeping efforts. (4) As consumers' freshness preference and brand preference become more and more obvious, the revenue sharing contract is easier to promote member's input in freshness-keeping and promotion efforts, thus bringing more market demand and increasing supply chain profit. Revenue sharing contract can realize Pareto improvement, effectively alleviate the "double marginal effect", and significantly improve the overall revenue of the fresh supply chain.

Key words: freshness-keeping effort, promotion effort, dual-channel supply chain, revenue sharing contract, dynamic perspective

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