Abstract:

With the rapid growth of information technology and the changes of consumer behavior and preference， dual channels are pervasive in market operation. More retailers are adopting both online and offline sales channels by adding online stores to their traditional brick-and-mortar locations. Note that retailers are closer to their market and may also have better expertise in observing the demand of the market than manufacturers， which implies that demand information asymmetry is prevalent. In this context， long-term relationship is more subtle. In multiperiod cooperation， the information disclosed by retailers in each period can be used as the basis for future contracts. Therefore， they worry that manufacturers use the disclosed information to design future contracts that are unfavorable to themselves and have the motivation to report dishonestly. Thus， different incentive mechanisms are designed by manufacturers to screen retailers. Summing up， in the dual-channel supply chain with private demand information， the game theory and operational research optimization methods are embraced to develop three dynamic incentive mechanisms according to the level of separation. The impacts of asymmetric information and its degree on contract design， and the optimal contract selection are explored.Specifically， the benchmark under symmetric information is established firstly. Then， the full separation， full pooling and partial separation contracts under asymmetric information are modeled based on the level of separation respectively. Further， the retailer’s optimal price is analyzed. Finally， the contract preferences of retailer， manufacturer and supply chain are studied， accordingly， the win-win strategy is found， as well as the improvement of contract selection when the contract preferences are inconsistent. It is found that contractual design is closely related to the asymmetric information and its level； due to the influences of allocation and rent effects， the profit of the second period cannot be improved by information updating； regarding the cooperation of decentralized supply chain， the contract selection among the retailer， manufacturer and supply chain is affected by the discount factor， ex ante belief of manufacturer on the high-type retailer and pooling ratio， and there is a win-win situation. When the manufacturer’s contract preference is the same as that of supply chain while differs to that of the retailer， the contract selection improvement can be achieved by paying the retailer some new transfer payments. These conclusions provide the corresponding management insights. Firstly， the impact of information should be considered when manufacturers design contract； secondly， multiperiod cooperation is complex， and all players should maximize the profit of the total period， not the profit of a certain period； finally， for manufacturers， transfer payment can be used as an efficient tool to manage retailers and develop a stable and healthy relationship.

Key words: asymmetric information, dual-channel supply chain, contract selection, the level of separation