Abstract:

Under the downward pressure of the economy affected by the epidemic， the development of platform economy has become an important path to optimize and upgrade China's industrial structure， accelerate the transformation of new and old drivers， and balance the development of resource elements. How to achieve a standardized， transparent and sustainable governance of the platform economy has become afocus. With the prosperity and development of the platform economy， it has become a widespread consensus to guide the platform to participate in the governance process， and to form a joint force with the government by virtue of its advantages in technology and information. How to effectively play the role of coordinated governance has become an important issue. In this paper， the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the problem of coordinated governance of platform economy. By considering the influence of random disturbances and continuous strategy sets on the stable evolution of the game system state， and creatively introducing such parameters as government and platform effort level， platform right space and platform service quality output， and the game model of determination and random evolution in the case of binary strategy sets and continuous strategy sets is built gradually， the similarities and differences of the evolution path of collaborative governance in the four theoretical models are compared and analyzed， the path measures are explored to effectively exert the governance effect， and numerical simulation analysis is conducted.It is found that the introduction of random disturbance has improved the difficulty of coordinated governance. The reputation loss of the government higher than the cost of efforts can helps to reduce the impact of random disturbance；The expansion of the strategy set into a continuous type will affect the evolution of the game system towards the state of collaborative governance. The role of the platform's power space in promoting the collaborative governance is significantly inferior to the high and low levels；The expansion of the strategy set into a continuous type will affect the evolution of the game system towards the state of collaborative governance. The contribution of this paper is to introduce random disturbance and continuous strategy set into the evolutionary game model of platform economic governance， which makes up for the deficiency of model construction in the existing literature and provides theoretical reference for subsequent related research.

Key words: platform economy, government-enterprise collaboration, evolutionary game