Abstract:

In recent years， sudden natural disasters and public health incidents have brought serious threats to people's health and life safety， and have greatly hindered social and economic development. After disasters， the demand for emergency supplies usually increases explosively， in order to improve emergency response capabilities， the government needs to jointly reserve emergency supplies with a supplier in advance， that is， in addition to the government's regular reserves， the supplier is responsible for the production and storage of some emergency supplies as the flexible reserve quantity， and the flexible reserve quantity is determined according to the flexible procurement contract provided by the government. However， in the process of actual government-enterprise alliance， the degree of risk aversion of supplier is their private information， and the government cannot accurately grasp the reserve willingness of supplier. Therefore， based on the analysis of game relationship between supply chain costs and profits in emergency situations， a Stackelberg game model led by the government in different situations is established， and the model is verified by numerical simulation.Our findings contribute to the use of contract design mechanisms to coordinate the literature of emergency supply chains under asymmetric information， and provide assistance to the government in deciding how to stimulate the cooperate willingness of supplier in order to achieve emergency purposes.The main work of this paper includes　firstly， propose the government's optimal contract design and the supplier's optimal flexible reserve under symmetrical information and asymmetrical information respectively； secondly， on the basis of the above， supply chain member’s optimal pricing and optimal reserve strategy under different risk aversion types are analyzed； third， the government’s optimal contract design and the changes in the costs and benefits of supply chain members under complete information and asymmetric information are compared； finally， the impact of asymmetry information on the willingness to share information of supplier and the influence of negotiation mechanisms is further discussed.The results show that when the government accurately understands the type of supplier risk aversion， the flexible procurement contract can achieve the perfect coordination of the humanitarian supply chain； due to the existence of asymmetric information， the government’s disadvantage information will lead to an increase in expected costs， and supplier advantage information will bring additional benefits， the government’s information value is greater than the supplier’s information rent， leading to the loss of expected profits of the supply chain system； under certain conditions， the supplier will choose information sharing negotiations to share their private information with the government， promote the expected profit of the supply chain system to achieve the optimal level.

Key words: government-enterprise alliance, asymmetric information, emergency supplies reserve, pricing of emergency supplies, contract design