基于政府不同补贴形式下的绿色产品制造商渠道选择策略分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1986

Abstract

Abstract:

To promote sustainable supply chain development， the government usually adopts different forms of subsidies based on the cost of green R&D， and manufacturers also develop different channel structures to sell their products based on the different forms of government subsidy. A supply chain game model with a government as the Stackelberg leader， a manufacturer and a retailer is developed. Based on two forms of R&D cost subsidy and unit production subsidy provided by the government， the optimal government’s subsidy rate， the manufacturer's wholesale price， green level， and the retailer's order quantity are explored as well as the profit or utility function of each channel member under different channel structures. The results show that when the manufacturer can better control their green R&D costs， the unit production subsidy provided by the government will be better for producing environmentally friendly products， and the profit of the manufacturer. Moreover， unit production subsidy can also make the retailer more profitable if the manufacturer reduces the cost of developing green technologies. Our research reveals the close correlation between the government subsidy strategy and manufacturers' green technology input and channel structure. When the government provides with the manufacturer R&D cost form， the manufacturer’s dual-channel structure reduces government expenditures and is a better option for the manufacturer， the retailer and the government if the manufacturer reduces its green R&D cost. However， when the government provides the subsidy to the manufacturer in the form of unit production subsidies， the manufacturer needs to choose a proper channel structure based on the consumer environmental awareness， the price elasticity， the cost rate of green technology development and the marginal rate of return of environmental improvement. In addition， from the government's point of view， when the development cost of green technology or the marginal benefit of environmental improvement is low， the adoption of unit production subsidy will be more conducive to the government’s policy on promoting environmentally friendly products， and more conducive to the interests of both the manufacturer and the retailer. Otherwise， the government is suggested to adopt a strategy of R&D cost subsidy.

Key words: green supply chain, subsidy, channel strategy, green level, government performance

CLC Number:

F272

Kebing Chen,Yuqi Wang. Channel Selection Strategy of the Green-product Manufacturer under Different Forms of Government Subsidies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(3): 167-177.

Figures/Tables 10

决策	研发成本补贴( $y = I$ )	单位生产补贴 ( $y = P$ )
$Δ f B y *$	$f (1 - θ) [16 α + k A [7 + θ (4 + θ)]] - 2 k 2 α (3 + θ) k A B + 16 α (1 - θ)$	—
$t B y *$	—	$k α (3 + θ) [8 f (1 - θ) + k 2 (3 + θ)] + 4 f 2 A (1 - θ) 2 [7 + θ (4 + θ)] 2 f (1 - θ) [2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2]$
$e B y *$	$k A B + 16 α (1 - θ) 32 f (1 - θ) - k 2 B$	$k (k α + 2 f A) (3 + θ) 2 2 f (2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2)$
$w B y *$	$c + 8 (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - k 2 B$	$c + 4 f 2 A (1 - θ) (- 1 + θ (5 + θ (3 + θ))) + k 3 α (3 + θ) 2 - 4 f k α (1 - θ) (3 + θ) 2 f (1 - θ) (2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2)$
$p r B y *$	$c + 4 (3 - θ) (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - k 2 B$	$c + 4 f 2 A (1 - θ 2) (2 + θ + θ 2) + k 3 α (3 + θ) 2 - 2 f k α (1 - θ 2) (3 + θ) 2 f (1 - θ) (2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2)$
$p d B y *$	$w B I *$	$w B P *$
$D r B y *$	$4 (1 - θ) (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - k 2 B$	$(1 - θ) (3 + θ) (k α + 2 f A) 2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2$
$D d B y *$	$4 (1 - θ) (2 + θ) (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - k 2 B$	$(1 - θ) (2 + θ) (3 + θ) (k α + 2 f A) 2 f (1 - θ) C - k 2 (3 + θ) 2$

决策	研发成本补贴 ( $y = I$ )	单位生产补贴 ( $y = P$ )
$Δ f S y *$	$3 f k (1 + θ) A + 2 α [8 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)] 16 α (1 - θ) + 7 k (1 + θ) A$	—
$t S y *$	—	$12 f 2 A (1 - θ) + k α [8 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)] 2 f (1 - θ) [2 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)]$
$e S y *$	$7 k (1 + θ) A + 16 α (1 - θ) 32 f (1 - θ) + 7 k 2 (1 + θ)$	$k (k α + 2 f A) (1 + θ) 2 f [2 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)]$
$w S y *$	$c + 8 (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - 7 k 2 (1 + θ)$	$c - 4 f 2 A (1 - θ) + k α [4 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)] 2 f (1 - θ) [2 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)]$
$p r S y *$	$c + 12 (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - 7 k 2 (1 + θ)$	$c - k α 2 f (1 - θ)$
$D r 1 S y *$	$4 (1 - θ 2) (k α + 2 f A) 32 f (1 - θ) - 7 k 2 (1 + θ)$	$(1 - θ 2) (k α + 2 f A) 2 f (1 - θ) - k 2 (1 + θ)$

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Channel Selection Strategy of the Green-product Manufacturer under Different Forms of Government Subsidies

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