Abstract:

The fight for supply chain control powers has been a common problem between supply chain members， which makes supply chains unstable and leads to the loss of both parties' profits. The control power has a significant impact on product pricing， ordering quantity of the supply chain， and the cooperation performance of fresh product supply chain members. So， the allocation of supply chain control powers among different members is of great significance to the sustainability of the supply chain cooperation.Assuming that a two-level fresh product supply chain composed of one fresh product supplier and one large supermarket. The supermarket decides the selling price according to its own market positioning， consumer purchasing psychology and product market demand. At the same time， the supermarket will make certain freshness-keeping efforts to ensure the sales of fresh products. The supermarket has the supply chain control power which not only determines the selling price， but also controls the decision-making order. The selling price is regarded as a function of control power， and the demand is affected by the price， freshness-keeping efforts and random variable. A game model under the decentralized and centralized is constructed to maximize profits. The optimal control power， fresh-keeping effort and order quantity are solved respectively by Stackelberg game and cooperative game.This study introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into fresh product supply chain models. Some computational studies are conducted to investigate the impacts of price coefficient of control power and sensitivity coefficient of freshness-keeping efforts on the profits of supplier， supermarket， and the overall supply chain under decentralized and centralized system， and the effect of the residual value subsidy on coordinated supply chain member’s expected profit.Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly， the optimal control power exists objectively， and has a reverse relationship with the coefficient of control power. Supermarkets should improve the ability of influencing product pricing through their own reputation， public praise and service， instead of just competing for control power； Secondly， the profit， order quantity and the level of freshness-keeping efforts of centralized model is higher than that of decentralized model. But the profit of the supermarket will decrease. The residual value subsidy mechanism can solve the problem of double marginal effect of supply chain and realize Pareto improvement of supply chain members' income. Thirdly， holiday， weather， consumer psychology and other random factors will affect the market demand of fresh product. The managers of supermarkets can make appropriate measures with their supply chain control power to cope with changes in market demand.Our contribution lies in this paper introduces the endogenous variable of control power and builds the supply chain cooperation based on the control mode. The effects of control power and consumer freshness sensitivity coefficients on the optimal decision-making and system profit are analyzed. And it provides a certain reference for the supermarkets’ sales practice of fresh products.

Key words: freshness-keeping efforts, control power, fresh produce, residual value subsidy