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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (8): 22-31.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1880

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Research on the Selection of Government R&D Subsidy Strategy under Leading Enterprise-driven Cluster

Ai-hong LIAO1,Yan-qiu LU1(),Li-jun PANG2   

  1. 1.School of Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China
    2.HSBC Business School, Peking University, Shenzhen 518055, China
  • Received:2020-10-04 Revised:2020-12-07 Online:2023-08-15 Published:2023-08-24
  • Contact: Yan-qiu LU E-mail:luyq@jlu.edu.cn

Abstract:

Innovation input subsidy and innovation product subsidy are the two most typical R&D subsidies. The leading-driven cluster is taken as the research background, a two-stage game model involving leaders and followers in industrial clusters is constructed, and the influence of government R&D subsidy mode and subsidy object selection on enterprise R&D investment is analyzed. The results show that: (1)In the case of high technology spillover, the effect of innovation input subsidy is better than that of innovation product subsidy.In the case of low technology spillover, the effect of the two kinds of subsidies on enterprise R&D investment is basically the same. (2)If both leaders and followers are subsidized, it is only possible to increase the enthusiasm of followers for R&D investment. If subsidies are only given to leaders or only given to followers, most of the time, the R&D investment enthusiasm of subsidized enterprises will be improved, while the enthusiasm of R&D investment of non subsidized enterprises will be damaged. (3)The effect of R&D subsidies on high-tech spillover clusters is better than that on low-tech spillover clusters.This study theoretically extends the existing research on R&D subsidy policy, and provides a useful reference for the government to formulate R&D subsidy policies for industrial clusters.

Key words: R&D subsidy, leading enterprise-driven cluster, Stackelberg game, technological spillover

CLC Number: