Abstract: Information sharing has always been a hot issue in supply chain management research. Most of the literature focuses on demand forecast information sharing, assuming that the supply is deterministic. However supply uncertainty is a common phenomenon in reality and supply forecast information sharing also plays an important role in improving supply chain performance. The literature on supply forecast sharing assumes that the recipient of the information either absolutely trusts in the sender of the message or not at all. zer et al. (2011) confirmed through behavioral experiments that both parties trust each other to a certain extent according to their own judgments. Therefore, the supply forecast sharing strategy of supply chain members is studied from the perspective of trust.In order to explore the impact of trust on supply forecast information sharing and supply chain coordination, the operation of supply chain in centralized decision-making is analyzed. Secondly, the Stackelberg game is used to analyze the cases that the retailer absolutely trusts, completely distrusts, and partially trusts in the manufacturer. Finally, the operation of supply chain where the retailer trusts in the manufacturer to some extent is analyzed and the buyback contract is used to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the trust of retailers in manufacturer affects the performance of supply chain; the larger the psychological negative utility coefficient of manufacturer's lying, the more the manufacturer inclines to tell the truth; the buy back contract can promote the manufacturer to share the supply information truthfully; when the psychological negative utility coefficient of manufacturer's lying is larger, there exists an optimal buy back price which can achieve the supply chain coordination.

Key words: supply chain, trust, supply forecast information sharing, supply chain coordination