Abstract: Public participation in environmental behavior, which is an important part of the deepening reform of ecological civilization has a non-negligible impact on the level of public health caused by pollutants emissions from fossil fuels. Environmental pollution originates from fossil energy use in enterprises and lax government oversight, which damage to public health. An interactive model between the enterprise’s energy transformation and government regulation is built considering the public participation in environmental management skills, environmental knowledge mastery, and public own health concern using evolutionary theories in which the public is set a main strategy of parameters, and enterprise and governments are set as the two principal parts that influenced public health. It is followed by numerical simulation with a questionnaire and the replicator dynamic equation, analyzing the evolutionary process of the interactive behavior of enterprises and government with the software of Matlab, showing that the effect of each different parameter from a game subject on the strategy of evolutionary results. The model presents two evolutionarily stable strategies: one is a set of a strategy, regulation and non-transformation, another is regulation and transformation. It is found that the extent of environmental control and the degree of public health care affect the evolutionary path of the enterprise’s transformation and government regulation. Compensation for public health loss is an important factor of government strict regulation. The degree of mastering government regulation knowledge, implementation of energy policy, the cost of energy transformation and additional income are important factors of the enterprise’s energy transformation. Besides, the result of the research shows that public health losses are going to go down significantly only can be the parameters for each subject of the game changed together, moreover, public pro-environmental behavior reaches over 90%. A strategy change of a single subject couldn’t act on public health improvement. The ideal evolutionary strategy of {implementing energy transformation, government non-regulation} has not shown up yet in the current situation of China. It also can be found that the public participation in environmental behavior has a positive effect on energy transformation as long as the public participates in environmental governance, regardless of how much to participate in the extent of environmental behavior. This article provides a new perspective for stimulating public participation in environmental behaviors and promoting the formulation of corporate energy transition and public health promotion policies.

Key words: public participation in environmental behavior, public health, evolutionary game, enterprise’s energy transformation, government regulation