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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (8): 104-113.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.08.009

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Multi-party Behavior Game Research of Cross-border E-commerce Logistics Alliance Based on 4PL

DU Zhi-ping1, FU Shuai-shuai2, MU Dong3, WANG Dan-dan4   

  1. 1. School of Logistics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
    4. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
  • Received:2018-06-05 Revised:2018-10-30 Online:2020-08-20 Published:2020-08-25

Abstract: The rapid rise of cross-border e-commerce broadened the development space of cross-border e-commerce logistics. As a new logistics development model generated by the practice of the enterprises, the 4PL-based cross-border e-commerce logistics alliance can effectively satisfy consumers' comprehensive demand for cross-border e-commerce logistics. However, the cross-border e-commerce logistics alliance led by the cross-border e-commerce platform is a multi-member operation organization, and each member of which conducts multiple dynamic and complex games in the business operation. The game relationship between the members is crucial to the stable operation of the alliance. Therefore, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the dynamic game process between cross-border e-commerce platform, logistics service provider and merchants in the alliance, and the tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed. Based on the investigation of relevant enterprises, system dynamics is used to simulate and analyze the dynamic game process of the three-party strategy selection. The results show that: (1) In the process of alliance operation, the three parts of platform supervision, logistics enterprise efforts and merchant participation will eventually reach the equilibrium. And the merchant participation plays an important role in the stable operation of the alliance. At the same time, the platform supervision has a direct impact on the strategic choice of logistics enterprises. The platform should formulate scientific penalties and compensation rulings to improve the quality of logistics services and protect the interests of merchants. (2) Participants in the alliance have high sensitivity to their relevant exogenous variables, but the final strategy is influenced by multiple variables. For this reason, the platform needs to play the leading role and take various measures to stimulate the enthusiasm of logistics enterprises and merchants. The research in this paper provides a methodological guidance for multi-party operation management based on 4PL cross-border e-commerce logistics alliance, and has enlightening significance for the improvement of the alliance operational level.

Key words: 4PL cross-border e-commerce logistics alliance, multi-party behavior, evolutionary game, system dynamics

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