Abstract: The quality of logistics service depends on the joint efforts of the integrator (LSI) and the provider (FLSP) in the logistics service supply chain (LSSC). In the real environment, both parties will update and adjust behaviors according to their perception and judgment on economic interests, thus resulting in the deviation of behavioral decisions, which leads to the difficulty in achieving the optimal evolutionary results. However, the existing researches around logistics service supply chain management mostly focus on the expected utility theory and take the objective value of gain/loss as the basis of decision-making, which ignores the behavioral deviation caused by the characteristic of bounded rationality of decision-makers. In this regard, prospect theory is integrated into evolutionary game in this paper to explore the dynamic evolution of logistics service quality management, extending the discussion on the risk attitude, perceived probability and other psychological factors in the logistics service supply chain. The perceived value function in prospect theory is adopted in the payoff matrix of evolutionary game taking into account of substitution effect caused by the competition in the logistics service market. By considering parameters such as loss aversion coefficient and gain/loss sensitivity coefficient in prospect theory, the law of behavior evolution of players is demonstrated from the perspective of perceived value and the behavior deviation generated by traditional game theory and the expected utility theory can be adjusted when explaining the game of logistics service quality management. Based on this, the game process between FLSP's service strategy and LSI's control strategy is analyzed and a simulation analysis is performed to depict the influence of key psychological factors, substitution effect and responsibility sharing ratio on the evolution system. The results indicate that:(1) Intensifying the FLSP's perceived value of default cost and reinforcing the substitution effect among the LSIs are proved as effective ways for the system to converge to the optimal evolutionary stable point; (2) The problem of service default can be effectively mitigated by improving the cognition degree of LSIs and FLSPs on logistics risk; (3) The influences of core elements on the system evolution are different, and the simulation results can be used to explain practical problems induced by improper sharing of responsibilities for LSIs and FLSPs. This paper aims to provide new research and management insight for improving the logistics service quality from the perspective of competition mechanism and responsibility sharing contract.

Key words: LSSC, service quality control, prospect theory, evolutionary game