政府监管与隐形契约共同作用下集群企业创新合作的演化博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.11.009

Abstract

Abstract: In the perfection of market economy system in China, enterprise opportunism behavior in cooperation is relatively common due to lack of enough good faith.However, the enterprises within the industry cluster have been paid much attention because of the less opportunism behavior and innovation cooperation advantages.The reason is that in the development of mature industrial clusters, cluster enterprises often affected by the cluster informal contract in addition to the formal contract by market mechanism. Consider the formal regulation and informal contract of cluster innovation cooperation between enterprises, the evolutionary game method is used to establish the tripartite asymmetric game model among government, informal organization and cluster enterprises, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy of the three parties, and numerical simulation analysis is used for further validation research. The results show that, both the government's formal regulation and the informal cluster contractwill be able to produce good constraints to cluster enterprise cooperative innovation.Specially, government formal regulation has the more intensive constraint than the informal contract and plays an important role in cluster enterprise cooperation at the beginning of the cluster development.However, the effect of informal contract is more lasting and steady. Therefore, the cluster government should encourage the formal constraint and implicit contracts at the same time for enterprises innovation cooperation. In addition, the government should also guide the construction of the relevant industry association, pay attention to the maintenance and development the cluster informal contract. Through studying the behavior of cluster enterprise innovation cooperation process, this paper can help to learn more about the supervision and constraint mechanism of industrial cluster, promote the transformation and upgrading of industrial cluster, guide the innovation cooperation of cluster enterprise,cultivate industrial cluster with strong innovation and enhance the core competitiveness of the industry development in China.

Key words: industrial cluster, implicit contracts, innovation cooperation, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F272

HAN Ying, CHEN Guo-hong. Three-party Evolutionary Game of Cluster Enterprises Innovation Cooperation based on Government Supervision and Implicit Contract[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(11): 88-95.

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Three-party Evolutionary Game of Cluster Enterprises Innovation Cooperation based on Government Supervision and Implicit Contract

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