基于演化博弈的区块链技术在供应链金融中的应用研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1538

Abstract

Abstract:

Because of the risks existing in supply chain finance， taking accounts receivable factoring business as the research object， the factors affecting the decision-making of the participants in supply chain finance are analyzed， an evolutionary game model between small and medium-sized enterprises and financial institutions is constructed， and the mechanism of blockchain to solve the financial risks of the supply chain is analyzed by comparing the changes of evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain technology. And taking the actual case as the background for example analysis， the main conclusions are verified. It is found that firstly， credit risk plays a decisive role in whether financial institutions accept financing business decisions. Blockchain technology can reduce the operational risk of financial institutions and improve the business income of financial institutions； Secondly， the strict regulatory environment formed by blockchain technology makes the default behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises in a high-risk state at all times. No matter the profit distribution proportion that small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain through collusion， they will not choose to default， which effectively solves the paradox that small and medium-sized enterprises cannot obtain loans from financial institutions despite the increased probability of compliance. Then， the evolutionary game between financial institutions and small and medium-sized enterprises is balanced in that financial institutions accept business applications， small and medium-sized enterprises abide by the contract， and the convergence effect is better. Therefore， blockchain technology not only reduces the financing risk of financial institutions， but also helps to solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises.

Key words: blockchain, supply chain finance, account receivable factoring, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

C934

Rui Sun,Dayi He,Huilin Su. Application of Blockchain Technology to Preventing Supply Chain Finance Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(3): 125-134.

Figures/Tables 10

参数	含义
$R$	应收账款额度
$k$	应收账款保理授信率（质押率）
$r p$	中小企业融资后用于正常生产时的收益率
$C p$	中小企业的违约成本
$C p'$	区块链技术使用后中小企业的违约成本
$C$	中小企业的生产成本
$C b$	金融机构的征信成本
$r b'$	金融机构的存款利率
$r b$	金融机构的贷款利率
$x$	金融机构选择接受业务申请时的概率
$y$	中小企业选择守约时的概率
$α$	中小企业在不守约的情况下选择联合骗贷的概率
$P$	联合骗贷时中小企业所获利益的分配比率
$M$	区块链平台维护费

		中小企业
		不守约 $(1 - y)$		守约 $(y)$
		联合骗贷 $(α)$	非合谋 $(1 - α)$	守约 $(y)$
金融机构	接受 $(x)$	$- k R (1 + r b') - C b$ $k R P (1 + r p)$	$(1 - k) R - C b - k R r b'$ $k R (1 + r p) - C - C p$	$(1 - k) R - C b - k R r b'$ $k R (1 + r p) - C$
金融机构	不接受 $(1 - x)$	$k R (r b - r b') - C b$ $0$	$k R (r b - r b') - C b$ $R - C - C p$	$k R (r b - r b') - C b$ $R - C$

	条件	均衡点	detJ符号	trJ符号	结论
情况1	$k (1 + r p) - 1 k (1 + r p) < P < α R [k (1 + r p) - 1] + C p + α (R - C - C p) α k R (1 + r p)$	$E 1$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
		$E 2$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
		$E 3$	$+$	不确定	不稳定
		$E 4$	$+$	$-$	ESS稳定
		$E 5$	$+$	$0$	不稳定
情况2	$P > α R [k (1 + r p) - 1] + C p + α R - α C - α C p α k R (1 + r p)$	$E 1$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
		$E 2$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
		$E 3$	$-$	$-$	鞍点
		$E 4$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
		$E 5$	$+$	$0$	不稳定

		中小企业
		不守约 $(1 - y)$		守约 $(y)$
		联合骗贷 $(α)$	非合谋 $(1 - α)$	守约 $(y)$
金融机构	接受 $(x)$	$- k R (1 + r b') - M$ $k R P (1 + r p)$	$(1 - k) R - M - k R r b'$ $k R (1 + r p) - C - C p'$	$(1 - k) R - M - k R r b'$ $k R (1 + r p) - C$
金融机构	不接受 $(1 - x)$	$k R (r b - r b') - M$ $0$	$k R (r b - r b') - M$ $R - C - C p$	$k R (r b - r b') - M$ $R - C$

条件	均衡点	detJ符号	trJ符号	结论
$k (1 + r p) - 1 k (1 + r p) < P < α R [k (1 + r p) - 1] + C p + α (R - C - C p) α k R (1 + r p)$	$E 1$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
	$E 2$	$-$	不确定	鞍点
	$E 3$	$+$	不确定	不稳定
	$E 4$	$+$	$-$	ESS稳定
	$E 5$	$+$	$0$	不稳定

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Application of Blockchain Technology to Preventing Supply Chain Finance Based on Evolutionary Game

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