惩罚机制下农产品质量安全投入演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.08.018

Abstract

Abstract: In recent years, agricultural products accidents of quality and safety occur frequently, which has caused great harm to people's health. Since the quality and safety of agricultural products depend on all members of the agricultural supply chain, for example, suppliers, producers, sales and so on. Quality and safety problem in any link may lead to the unqualified quality of agricultural products.Improving agriculture products' quality and safety requires collective action and the design the of governance structures which overcome the information and coordination problem within the supply chain. In China, the quality and safety of agricultural products are mainly ensured and controlled by suppliers and producers. Because investment of quality and safety for agricultural product has a positive external effect, participants have an incentive to hitchhike. Then, how should the government encourage participants to increase investmentof quality and safety?
An evolutionary game model is built and a replicator equation is used to describe the selection and evolution path of suppliers and producers, according to payoff matrices of different behavior strategies of suppliers and producers. Furthermore, the stable equilibrium point is calculated and the evolutionarily stable strategy of suppliers and producers behavior is obtained from the Jacobin matrix. What's more, the influence of parameters of the system is analyzed. Finally, a simulation is used to compare the results under different punishment level, and some conclusions and recommendations are provided.
The results show that the investment strategy of suppliers and producers is related to the ratio of cost-benefit of quality and safety input. Some evolutionarily stable equilibrium can be found when the cost-benefit ratios change. Suppliers or producers will be reluctant to increase investment of quality and safety for the agricultural product if either of them has "free rider" behavior. Only when the government's punishmentreaches a certain threshold can the suppliers and the producers increase investment for quality and safety.The results have some inspiration for the policies-making of government institution and the agricultural firm investment strategy of quality and safety.

Key words: agricultural supply chain, quality and safety, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F224.32

YANG Song, ZHUANG Jin-cai, WANG Ai-feng. Evolutionary Game of Quality and Safety Investment of Agricultural Products under Punishment Mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(8): 181-190.

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Evolutionary Game of Quality and Safety Investment of Agricultural Products under Punishment Mechanism

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