复杂交互行为影响下的网络舆情演化分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.01.018

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 如今网民参与网络舆情的现象愈加普遍，但国内网络舆情治理体制不完善，网络舆情事件易造成严重的负面影响，研究网络舆情的重要性日渐显著。基于演化博弈研究复杂网络中的网络舆情能够反映网络舆情形成和演化的实际情况，可以为引导相关主体参与网络舆情的行为和控制网络舆情的演化提供科学依据。本文在网络舆情的复制动态模型中引入两个可以反映网民复杂交互行为的因素：创建新博弈连接的行为偏好以及维持博弈连接的时间长短，在此基础上构建网络舆情演化博弈模型。根据演化博弈均衡解，分析、解释个体复杂交互行为因素以及网民初始得益对网络舆情演化的影响并针对不同情境提出相应的舆情治理建议。研究表明在交互连接达到稳态时，网络舆情博弈的得益矩阵会发生改变，新的得益矩阵由原来得益矩阵中的元素乘以其相应的博弈连接类型的活跃连接占比而构成。本文定量地解释相关主体间复杂的交互行为，研究结果对网络舆情危机处理以及疏导，减少网络舆情事件对社会的危害等都有参考价值。

关键词: 网络舆情, 演化博弈, 交互行为

Abstract: Now it's much more common that people participate in online public opinion. But because of the imperfect network public opinion management system, the network public opinion events can make serious and negative effects easily. So the importance of studying network public opinion is increasingly significant. The study of the complex online public opinion based on evolutionary game theory can reflect the actual situation of the online public opinion formation and evolution. It helps to provide some scientific basis for guiding the users' behaviors and controlling the evolution of the online public opinion. This article introduces two factors into the replication dynamic model of online public opinion which can reflect the complex interaction behaviors between the internet users:the preferences of creating a new game connect and the lifetime of maintaining game connect. An evolutionary game model of network public opinion on this basis is built. According to evolutionary game equilibrium solution, how the complex interaction factors and the initial benefit influence the evolution of network public opinion is analyzed and explained. Besides, the corresponding suggestions about the network public opinion management for different situations are put forward. The study shows that when the interactive connections reach steady state, the gain matrix of the network public opinion will change. The elements in the original benefit matrix times its corresponding active connection proportion of the overall population under the different game connection type then the new benefit matrix is composed of the news elements. The complex interactions among the internet users are quantitatively explained. The study plays an important role in many aspects such as giving advices about online public opinion crisis management, reducing the potential hazards of online public opinion.

Key words: online public opinion, evolutionary game, interaction behavior

中图分类号:

C931.1

林燕霞, 谢湘生, 张德鹏. 复杂交互行为影响下的网络舆情演化分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 212-221.

LIN Yan-xia, XIE Xiang-sheng, ZHANG De-peng. Analysis of Online Public Opinion Evolution under the Influence of Complex Interaction Behaviors[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 212-221.

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